BARKER.DOC

1/9/2020 10:56 AM

Statutory Interpretation, Comparative
Law, and Economic Theory:
Discovering the Grund of
Income Taxation

WILLIAM B. BARKER*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 822
INTERPRETATION AND TEACHING METHODOLOGIES ........................................... 824
INTERPRETATION OF TAX STATUTES: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW .......................... 826
A. The Traditional Approach in the United Kingdom .................................. 827
B. The Traditional View in the United States: A Comparison ...................... 830
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S EARLY APPROACH
TO THE CONCEPT OF INCOME .............................................................................. 832
A. The Court Adopts the Traditional View ................................................... 832
B. The Court’s Decision in Eisner v. Macomber:
Formalistic Interpretation Triumphs ....................................................... 840
C. Eisner v. Macomber: The Court Assigns a
Meaning to the Term “Income” that Is at Variance
with Contemporary Economic Approaches and
Historical Understanding ........................................................................ 842

* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University; Visiting Professor of Law, The London School of Economics and Political
Science. Research for this paper was commenced when the author was a visitor at
Oxford University, where he taught the seminar component of the graduate course
Taxation. The author thanks the law department of Oxford University, and especially
Dr. R.J. Smith of Magdalen College, for their support, and Jody Madeira for her research
and assistance.

821

BARKER.DOC

1/9/2020 10:56 AM

D.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

The Dissenting Opinions in Eisner v. Macomber
Foreshadow the Future ............................................................................ 846
1. The Majority’s Narrow Definition of Income Was
Not in Accord with the Plain Meaning of the Term .......................... 846
2. The Majority’s Narrow Definition Was Not in
Accord with the Purpose Behind the Legislation .............................. 847
3. Formalism’s Defect: The Dissents .................................................... 848
FROM FORMALISM TO LEGAL PROCESS AND PURPOSIVIST
INTERPRETATION: THE REVOLUTION IN INTERPRETATION,
1930–1956 ........................................................................................................ 850
A. The Supreme Court Applies Purpose and Limits the
Scope of Prior Precedents ....................................................................... 850
B. The Supreme Court Overcomes the Force of Stare Decisis ..................... 855
C. Intentionalism and Purpose in the Judicial Development
of the Concept of Income in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass ............... 856
THE FORGOTTEN PURPOSE: THE HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF
INCOME TAXATION IN AMERICA......................................................................... 859
A. The Purpose of Congress and the American People ................................ 860
B. The Role of Purpose in the Interpretation of
the Concept of Income ............................................................................. 861
EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF TAX STATUTES IN THE
CONTEXT OF MODERN APPROACHES TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION ............................................................................................... 865
A. Textualism and the Heritage of Formalism.............................................. 865
B. Textualism, Purposivism, and Intentionalism:
The Use of Concepts, Standards, and Principles ..................................... 867
C. The Anglo-American Doctrine of the Equity of
the Statute ................................................................................................ 869
D. Roman Civil Law Analogical Development of
Statutes .................................................................................................... 870
THE PRINCIPLED DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF INCOME:
PURPOSIVIST INTERPRETATION AND INTENTIONALISM UNITED ........................... 873

“The notion of ambiguity must not be confused with that of
absurdity. To declare that [law] is absurd is to deny that it can
ever be given a meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert
that its meaning is never fixed, that it must be constantly won.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Income taxation is the primary way democratic societies allocate the
financial burden of government to its people. As law, its ever-present
form or superstructure has implications for a broad spectrum of human
activity, including not only overtly financial activities, but also many
1. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY 129 (Bernard Frechtman
trans., 3d ed. 1967). The Author replaced “existence” with “law.”
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personal activities such as birth and death, marriage and divorce, charity,
education, leisure, and work. Few laws have the force that income
taxation has to reach into our private lives and alter our behavior and
even our life choices.
The expanding meaning of income is the foundation of modern
income tax law. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the concept of
income has evolved over the years in a way that extends the reach of
taxation to objects arguably not within the original meaning of the word.
Such expansive interpretation of tax statutes, however, is out of step
with the traditional precepts of tax law interpretation, which are still the
norm in the world today.
This difference is reflected dramatically in the way Americans think
and even teach taxation compared with their colleagues abroad. When
comparing the United Kingdom and the United States, one notes that
both nations began with similar attitudes toward the interpretation of tax
statutes. The American approach changed dramatically over the years,
from a formalism that still describes the prevailing world view today to a
purposive approach that has expanded the concept of income. United
States tax law developed general precepts in accordance with legislative
purposes developed from the inner workings and practical necessity of
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) as a whole.
In expanding the reach of income taxation, the United States Supreme
Court repudiated the early Court’s reliance on a formalist interpretive
theory akin to modern-day textualism, substituting truth and reality for
plain meaning. Its approach reflected the new developments in the
interpretation of statutes in general, adopting a purposeful interpretation
reflecting legal process theories. Income taxation was developed to
meet changes in economic relations and new challenges to its
effectiveness. The Court accomplished this by interpreting income as a
concept not a rule.
Though unacknowledged by the Court, its approach to the concept of
income was in keeping with the forgotten purpose behind income tax
law in America. The historical forces that won the battle for the
Sixteenth Amendment2 and the modern income tax law justified radical
interpretation of tax statutes.3 This political context in America justifies
a purposive interpretation of tax statutes. The fundamental belief of the
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment gave Congress the
power to tax people on their income.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 215–26.
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legal process theories, that American law was based on superior democratic
decisionmaking, was, for once, a realistic assessment of the genesis of
income taxation. In enacting the first income tax law in 1913 under the
Sixteenth Amendment, Congress recounted the unique history of the
birth of income taxation in America.4 Our income tax law was the result
of intense social struggle resulting in the triumph of democratic
economic principle.5 The motivating force underlying the income tax
law and the Sixteenth Amendment that brought income taxation into
being was to overcome economic inequality.6 The fundamental concept
of fairness enshrined in our income tax law was distributional justice.
Thus, expansive interpretation of the concept of income to reach the
economic resources of taxpayers in all their forms accords with this
purpose and carries out the will of Congress and the American people.
This approach is immune to charges of judicial lawmaking because such
interpretation of tax statutes unites purposivism and intentionalism.
The methodology that best describes the Supreme Court’s approach to
the concept of income and justifies its development is a synthesis of the
Anglo-American doctrine of the positive “equity of the statute” with the
Roman civil-law doctrine providing for the analogical development of
statutes. These doctrines provide the tools for a nonarbitrary development
of the concept of income to cover unanticipated changes in the economic
relations of taxpayers over time. Analogical development in accordance
with the principle of distributive justice satisfies the democratic agenda
constituted in the Sixteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
II. INTERPRETATION AND TEACHING METHODOLOGIES7
Throughout the world, income taxation is a sociopolitical force of
immense proportions. And yet, as law it is rarely taught in the basic law
school curriculum in European universities, except in the Netherlands and
in the United Kingdom. Even in the United Kingdom, where many law
departments have added a course in taxation over the last fifteen years, there
are still some notable bastions of simpler times, such as Oxford University.8
4. See infra text accompanying notes 200–02.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 215–26.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 202–06.
7. The personal observations on legal education in taxation are based on the
Author’s extensive experience and countless conversations with colleagues both in the
United States and abroad. In addition to twenty years’ experience as a U.S. academic, the
Author has been a visiting professor at the Universities of London, Dublin (Trinity
College), Vienna, Oxford (visiting scholar), Cape Town, Witwatersrand, and the Free State.
The Author presently holds, in addition to his U.S. academic position, a long-term
appointment as visiting professor of law at the London School of Economics and Political
Science where he teaches, among other tax courses, United Kingdom Income Tax Law.
8. The law department of Oxford University intends to add a course in taxation to
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Unlike Europe, American law schools universally offer courses in
taxation as part of the first degree. Many would argue that tax law is an
indispensable part of a legal education; indeed, taxation is a required
course in a substantial number of law schools. Significantly, the primary
course in taxation in the United Kingdom is a general course that covers
income taxation, capital gains, inheritance, social security, and consumption
taxes (like the value added tax). In contrast, Americans do not teach a basic
course in taxation, but one in federal income taxation.
Income taxation in the United Kingdom is often approached first as a
general matter of statutory interpretation, especially as it relates to the
courts’ approach to tax avoidance. In the United States, academics start
with, focus on, and devote considerable effort to examining the concept
of income, but they rarely consider general theories of interpretation or
focus on the subject of income as an explicit question of statutory
interpretation. Instead, American academics look at “interpretation by
doing,” meaning that they examine what courts have said to develop the
principles and content of law, much in the fashion of common-law case
analysis. Thus, the study of tax, a subject that is and has always been a
creature of statute, rarely confronts tax as legislative creation that should
be called the best public law code in America but instead teaches
statutory interpretation by osmosis.
Teaching methodologies in the United Kingdom and the United States
essentially reflect the perspective of each nation in its approach to tax
law interpretation. After all, teaching the law is interpreting the law.
Certainly, teaching in the United Kingdom uses a process of examining
the legal norm in terms of specific applications. However, analysis in
the United Kingdom tends more toward a recitation of doctrine rather
than analytical problem solving. Reported cases are primarily examined for
their specific rules and not as a catalyst for the development of
fundamental principles. This view is reflected in the fact that the question
of the meaning of income in United Kingdom legislation is discussed
within the confines of each source of income rather than comprehensively.
Unlike those who teach tax law in the United Kingdom, academics in
the United States often teach tax principles analogically. That is,
knowledge of the tax law is derived through analogical comparisons of
specific fact situations with previously considered examples. As Roscoe
its first degree in law curriculum in the 2004–2005 academic year. Interview with Judith
Freedman, Professor, Worcester College, in Oxford, Eng. (May 8, 2002).
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Pound perceived, “All interpretations go on analogies. We seek to
understand one thing by comparing it with another. We construct a
theory of one process by comparing it with another.”9
Thus, American teaching is developmental. Many scholars tend to
focus more on first principles, use case law for its facts and holdings but
not necessarily for its reasoning, and supply content to the imperatives
by examining and testing situations beyond the cases that have been
decided. Many scholars take it to heart that the content of a statute is not
ultimately definable outside of its confrontation with specific applications.10
Analysis should not end with established results, but must be a vehicle
for solving new problems.
Hence, there is a direct link between teaching methodology and
interpretation in taxation.11 Because the interpretation and scope of law
depends on value judgments, teaching tax must examine these judgments.
Tax scholars in the United States, however, have been accused of not
teaching the law, but of merely teaching their own “aesthetic preferences.”12
If true, this is a significant criticism. However, if the process is to teach
congressional value choices and not personal “aesthetic preferences,”
then tax scholars in the United States can stand proudly behind their work.
Learning about income in the classroom, like interpreting tax law
itself, is a “process of becoming.” It is, in part, viewing income though
the dialectic of the “is” and the “ought.”13 By examining doctrines in
terms of economic principles, by comparing the realities and aspirations
of law, one learns not only the scope and limits of the law in practice,
but also the law’s true consequences and significance.
III. INTERPRETATION OF TAX STATUTES:
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
Courts must interpret law as the result of the clash of interests between
litigants. In private law, the object of law is to effectuate individual will.
When private wills collide in society, judges must decide whose will best
9. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 151 (1930).
10. Giuseppe Zaccaria, Analogy as Legal Reasoning: The Hermeneutic Foundation of
the Analogical Procedure, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND ANALOGY: FRAGMENTS OF LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND LINGUISTICS 42, 45 (Patrick Nerhot ed., 1991).
11. The relation between this approach to teaching and judicial method is reflected
in the following statement by Justice Frankfurter: “The search for relevant meaning is
often satisfied not by a futile attempt at abstract definition but by pricking a line through
concrete applications. Meaning frequently is built up by assured recognition of what
does not come within a concept the content of which is in controversy.” Bazley v.
Comm’r, 331 U.S. 737, 741 (1947).
12. Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859, 882–83 (1982).
13. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 9–10 (1940).

826

BARKER.DOC

1/9/2020 10:56 AM

[VOL. 40: 821, 2003]

Statutory Interpretation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

expresses the inherent public interest in individual acts. Whoever wins,
the premise is that the parties willed the result as the proper outcome.
Taxation is public law; “the object of litigation is the vindication of
constitutional or statutory policies.”14 Because the aim of public law is
the general good, one clear conclusion is that individual will must give
way to the public will. In tax, the clash in litigation can be perceived as
a private interest in not paying tax juxtaposed against the public interest
in collecting tax.
Unlike the regulation of individual conduct that focuses on conduct
considered to be a danger to the public, there is nothing inherently
sinister in not wanting to pay taxes. The classic nineteenth century view
of taxation was that public taxation law deprived the individual of
property due to the subjugation of the individual’s will to that of the
sovereign. Taxation was a necessary evil; thus, the obligation to pay tax
had to be mandated in clear and unequivocal language. In England, the
initial justification for income taxation was a national emergency—the
need for greatly increased revenues to support the war against
Napoleon.15 The zeitgeist of the early legislation was uneasy tolerance
and strict construction.16 In the United States, there was a similar pattern
in our short-lived experience with the early Civil War income tax acts.
Even some proponents of the Civil War legislation lamented the tax’s
inquisitorial character but concluded that there was no other way to cope
with the national crisis.17 Thus, the prevailing attitude in the nineteenth
century was that the property deprivation imposed by income tax law
was analogous to the deprivation of life or liberty imposed by criminal
law. This cultural context may help explain the basis for the classic
approach to the interpretation of statutes that impose taxes.
A. The Traditional Approach in the United Kingdom
Even today, English courts conclude that a law’s effect on a taxpayer
should be certain; that is, the taxpayer must be aware of whether he is

14. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976).
15. 2 STEPHEN DOWELL, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND TAXES IN ENGLAND 208–09
(3d ed. Frank Cass & Co. 1965) (1884).
16. Yitzhak Hadari, Tax Avoidance in Linear Transactions: The Dilemma of Tax
Systems, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 59, 63 n.11 (1994).
17. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1954).

827

BARKER.DOC

1/9/2020 10:56 AM

subject to a tax with respect to a particular financial happening.18 In the
United Kingdom, the burden to prove that a tax is due rests squarely upon
the government.19 This was succinctly stated by an English court in 1921:
It simply means that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly
said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. . . .
Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at
the language used.20

As recently as 1971, these precepts were confirmed.21
This literal approach is still the dominant approach to the
interpretation of tax statutes in the United Kingdom today. However,
one might note that judges are now much more likely to consider an
act’s context and purpose in construing its meaning.22 To establish
parliamentary purpose, courts may now look at legislative history when
the legislation is ambiguous or obscure.23 Nevertheless, the use of
legislative history has had little effect on the interpretation of
legislation.24
Though the United Kingdom has been struggling for many years with
the juridical role in combating tax avoidance through interpretation,25
changes in approach have had little effect on the fundamental approach
to income. This may be due in part to the form of the legislation and the
early development of principles that are difficult to overcome later.
In the United Kingdom, the first income tax act, enacted in 1799,
charged persons on income from certain activities and included “income
not falling under any of the foregoing rules.”26 Both general and specific
deductions were provided for in the act. In 1803, the legislation changed
from a global or analytic system to a schedular form of income

18. Vestey v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, [1979] 3 All E.R. 976, 986, 984 (Eng.).
19. Tennant v. Smith, [1892] A.C. 150, 154 (appeal taken from Scot.).
20. Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, [1921] 1 K.B. 64, 71
(Eng. C.A. 1920), aff’d, [1921] 2 K.B. 403 (Eng. C.A.).
21. Mangin v. Inland Revenue Comm’r, [1971] 1 A.C. 739, 793 (P.C. 1970)
(appeal taken from N.Z.). In the United States this doctrine is still followed when
considering penalties imposed upon taxpayers under the Internal Revenue Code. See
Comm’r v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959).
22. JOHN TILEY, REVENUE LAW 48 (2000).
23. Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All E.R. 42, 47 (Eng.).
24. TILEY, supra note 22, at 49.
25. A more substantive approach to the application of tax statutes was first
presented in W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1982] A.C. 300, 329,
334 (H.L. Eng. 1981). Considerable development of principles combating tax avoidance
has been significantly curtailed by the House of Lords in the recent case of MacNiven v.
Westmoreland Investments, Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. 865, 869, 874, 882 (H.L. Eng.).
26. 3 DOWELL, supra note 15, at 92–93 (discussing England’s Property and Income
Tax imposed in 1799); see also William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income
Tax Law in the United Kingdom and the United States, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 12 (1996).

828

BARKER.DOC

[VOL. 40: 821, 2003]

1/9/2020 10:56 AM

Statutory Interpretation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

taxation.27 The charge to tax was then on the gains or profits described
or comprised in the various schedules, some of which used different
terms for the concept of income.28 Even though the method of
assessment changed from a global to a schedular system, income tax in
the United Kingdom still begins with the concept of the taxpayer’s total
income.29
The question of “what constitutes income” has not been very
important to tax law in the United Kingdom for several reasons. The
legislation was passed before economists devoted much attention to the
subject. The economic definition of income was that of income “from
things” or “social income,” which included the annual production of
property and labor, minus an allowance for the costs of maintaining
capital.30 This economic concept of income complemented the English
schedular approach that was soon adopted and which taxed income from
various enumerated sources by schedular category and primarily
collected taxes at the source.31 Obviously, the fact that this schedular
approach used different terms to describe income under its various
schedules meant that income did not need to have the same meaning in
each schedule. England’s schedular system is in stark contrast with the
American global system that approached income comprehensively in
one section of the Code.32
Thus, the general approach to income taxation in England was
relatively straightforward. One started the analysis by first identifying a
statutory source such as land, employment, or a trade or profession, and
then carefully linked the possible taxable amount to that source.33
Income was that which proceeded from a source that was relatively
permanent. The particular sources were meticulously defined by the
courts. For this reason, many monetary benefits flowing to the taxpayer
were not taxable because they did not have a source. Such benefits
included capital gains, gambling receipts, horse racing proceeds,
burglary and windfalls, and other wrongful activities that were not

27. 3 DOWELL, supra note 15, at 99–102 (citing Property and Income Tax Act,
1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 122 (Eng.)); see also Barker, supra note 26, at 12–13.
28. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 1(1)(1) (Eng.).
29. Id. § 1(1)(2).
30. See Barker, supra note 26, at 10.
31. See id. at 21.
32. I.R.C. § 61 (2000).
33. See Barker, supra note 26, at 21–22.
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trades.34 Nor were many items swept into the catchall provision: “income
not falling under any of the foregoing rules.”35 This provision was always
interpreted to only include items strictly comparable to the enumerated
items in the schedules and was later limited by rewording the provision
to only include “annual profits or gains [not charged under Schedule A
or E].”36 Income receipts that had the element of periodicity were to be
distinguished from capital receipts. Thus, in the early years of tax
legislation, when courts had to struggle with the fundamental scope of
the charge to tax income, the United Kingdom followed a consistent
pattern of literal statutory construction. In response, United Kingdom
tax legislation has always been identified by precise, detailed provisions
that complement literal interpretation.37
B. The Traditional View in the United States: A Comparison
The traditional interpretation of tax statutes in the United States
echoes English doctrine: “[I]t is a settled rule that tax laws are to be
strictly construed against the state and in favor of the taxpayer.”38 This
doctrine of statutory construction has been said to be “founded so firmly
upon principles of equity and natural justice, as not to admit of
reasonable doubt.”39 One federal district court expressed the philosophy
underlying this approach by stating that tax laws “are in no just sense
either remedial laws or laws founded upon any permanent public policy,
and, therefore, are not to be liberally construed.”40
Clearly, classic interpretation of tax statutes in the United Kingdom and
the United States adhered to literal interpretation even when statutory
interpretation in other areas of law followed a more liberal approach.
Interpreting the language of statutes in terms of their purposes had an early
and long history in English law.41 As early as 1584 in Heydon’s Case, the
method was described as follows: “The true reason of the remedy; and
then the office of all the Judges is always to make such . . . construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
34. See id. at 22–23.
35. See 3 DOWELL, supra note 15, at 93.
36. Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 18(1)(b) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
37. For a proposal by a prominent scholar that the United Kingdom should
consider more open-ended statutory formulations, see generally John F. Avery Jones,
Tax Law: Rules or Principles?, 1996 BRIT. TAX REV. 580 (1996).
38. 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.01, at 1
(5th ed. 1992).
39. Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N.H. 556, 570 (1876).
40. United States v. Wigglesworth, 28 F. Cas. 595, 597 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No.
16,690).
41. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2001) (discussing English and American judges’ use of the equity of the statute).
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subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief . . . .”42
Purposeful interpretation in England included the examination of what
was called the equity of the statute, which contained both a positive and
a negative sense. Judges could extend the scope of statutes to provide
for the historically novel case. Judges could also limit the meaning of
the legislation upon a finding that the legislature could not have intended
a particular result that fit within the literal language of the statute.43
Thus, the goals, aims, or purposes of the statute were essential
components of the statute to be applied.
Traditionally, liberal interpretation was not considered appropriate for
tax statutes. Tax statutes were only considered to have one purpose: to
collect revenue. There was no mischief the law meant to cure. Though
the aim to support the state was a salutary one, it did not support an
extension of an individual’s obligation to pay tax by reason of equitable
principles of rightness and justice. Neither did general doctrine in
England embrace taxpayer equity that might limit the reach of the tax
law. The clear sense was that general principles of fairness were
incompatible with the arbitrariness of taxation.
Historically, this perspective was certainly logical. In considering
certain taxes, there is ample justification for the view that the legislative
need for revenue leads a legislature to tax whatever it can. Legislatures
tax the ownership of carriages or land as well as the purchase of
commodities of all sorts. They impose stamp taxes on documents and
sometimes place huge taxes on items such as alcohol, tobacco, or tea
because the taxes are effective in raising revenue or in acting as a
deterrent. There is often no apparent justice in who pays or why—just
the happenstance of personal preference or societal antipathy. Though
these criticisms may be largely inapplicable to income taxation, income
tax in England began at a time when it was perceived to be no different
in character from the rest of taxes.
The English construction of income tax statutes embraced this attitude.
Income taxation was an effective but disagreeable form of taxation.
There was nothing special about the birth of income taxation in the
United Kingdom other than that the country was in desperate need of
money to pay for the war against Napoleon.44
42. Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584).
43. See Manning, supra note 41, at 22–27 (explaining the nature of the doctrine of
the equity of the statute).
44. See 2 DOWELL, supra note 15, at 208–09.
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Initially, circumstances in America were not particularly different.
After the Civil War, the income tax met its demise in 1872 and was not
resurrected by Congress for over twenty years.45 America’s perception
of the income tax changed in the interim. Income taxation became a
celebrated cause in the 1890s and a permanent form of taxation in 1913
due to intense popular struggle for its existence.46 Moreover, the 1913
Income Tax Act (1913 Act) was passed at a time when new theories of
economics emerged and began to influence courts and legislators.47 This
was also a time when new views of the judiciary’s role in affecting the
course of the law began to emerge. These conflicts were eventually
played out in the interpretation of the scope of income taxation.
However, these developments initially had little impact on the Supreme
Court’s approach to income.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S EARLY APPROACH
TO THE CONCEPT OF INCOME
A. The Court Adopts the Traditional View
Whether in the United Kingdom or the United States, conventional
statutory interpretation is the inquiry into the meaning of a legislative act
as it applies to the particular situation involved. The meaning is that of
the legislature, and thus interpretation deals with the legislature’s intent
in enacting the particular provision.48 The initial query is how the
lawmaker intended the reader to understand these words.
A cardinal principle of interpretation is that the one clear manifestation
of the legislature’s intent is the words the legislature actually used.49
Moreover, lawmakers must have used the words in their ordinary sense.
The plain meaning of the words governs the interpretation. The plain
meaning rule is essentially literal linguistic interpretation. One should
not look for any underlying aim or purpose other than what the words
themselves convey, unless their meaning is uncertain or ambiguous.
Even if there is ambiguity, uncertainty is construed against the drafter.50
In 1913, when the first modern income tax law was enacted, there was
little in federal case law that dealt with the explication of the scope of
45. See PAUL, supra note 17, at 25.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 200–02.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 116–23.
48. Intent and purpose can arise in another context in taxation where the
motivations of the taxpayer are relevant. See Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent, and
Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 485, 485–86 (1967) (taking an
exploratory look at the role of state of mind in substantives rules of tax law).
49. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
50. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
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the concept of income.51 The Civil War tax had been adopted merely as
a temporary measure,52 and the income tax enacted by Congress in 1894
had been quickly declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.53
How was the Court to approach the construction of the term “income”?
Few cases had dealt with the scope of the term. There was little
authoritative interpretation to guide the Court’s construction of income
in the 1913 Act.54
The difficulty presented by the concept of income is obscured by the
deceptive simplicity of the charge to tax. In the United States, the tax is
imposed on the taxable income of each taxpayer.55 The Code provides
that “‘taxable income’ means gross income minus the deductions
allowed.”56 The meaning of the term “gross income” is described as
follows: “[G]ross income means all income from whatever source
derived, including (but not limited to) the following items . . . .”57 This
language is remarkably similar to the 1913 Act, passed in accordance
with the Sixteenth Amendment, which provided that “net income . . .
shall include gains, profits, and income derived from [enumerated
activities] or gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever.”58 Congress has indicated that the change in language was not

51. One important interpretation may be found in Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 63, 64–65 (1872), where the Court concluded that the gain on the sale of treasury
bonds held for several years was not taxed as annual income under the 1867 Act.
52. See ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861–1913, at 53–56 (1993).
53. The principle cases of the Court were concerned with the appropriate
classification of income taxes as direct taxes subject to the requirement of apportionment
under Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court
determined that the income tax was constitutional in Springer v. United States, 102 U.S.
586, 593 (1880) (dealing with the taxation of individuals), and Pacific Insurance Co. v.
Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 446 (1868) (dealing with the taxation of companies).
However, the Supreme Court found parts of the 1894 Act unconstitutional in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895), aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895). All three cases dealt with the concept of income in its general or fundamental aspects.
54. The principle source of guidance to the 1861 Act was provided by the
administration. The commissioners’ views were in most cases final. See EDWIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF
INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 469 (2d ed. 1921). These interpretations had
been published starting in 1865. Id. at 469 n.1. For a good summary, see generally
INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS (1870).
55. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2000).
56. Id. § 63(a).
57. Id. § 61 (specifying fifteen items).
58. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
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intended as a change in substance.59 This language was similar to that of
the Civil War Act of 1861 (1861 Act) and the Revenue Act of 1894
(1894 Act).60 The language of all subsequent acts differed in one
important detail from the 1861 Act: Congress deleted the word “annual.”61
Significantly, the modern English income tax act added the word “annual”
to quite similar language, legislating a more restrictive scope to the
concept of income.62
Unlike property and sales taxes and duties where the subject matter is
fairly narrow, immediately apparent in the 1913 Act is the potential
breadth of the terms “gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever,”63 or of the present formulation, that income is “income from
whatever source derived.”64 Income is a legal abstraction of the financial
activity of multidimensional man in civil society. This is the foundation
upon which the structure of income taxation is erected. Establishing its
scope was clearly an essential task.
The Supreme Court’s initial response followed a traditional approach to
taxation. One of the earliest issues before the Court was whether alimony
payments were income to the recipient. The Court set the stage for its approach
to income by citing traditional Anglo-American views of tax statutes:
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend
their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or
to enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out.
In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the Government, and in
favor of the citizen.65

59. House Report 1337 commented upon the definition of income in section 61 as
follows:
This section corresponds to section 22(a) of the 1939 Code. While the
language in existing section 22(a) has been simplified, the all-inclusive nature
of statutory gross income has not been affected thereby. Section 61(a) is as
broad in scope as section 22(a).
Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes “all income from
whatever source derived.” This definition is based on the 16th Amendment
and the word “income” is used in its constitutional sense.
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A18 (1954).
60. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553; Act of Aug. 5,
1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862).
61. Compare § 49, 12 Stat. 292 (using the word “annual” when referring to income),
with § 27, 28 Stat. at 553 (not using the word “annual” when referring to income), and § IIB,
38 Stat. at 167 (also not using the word “annual” when referring to income).
62. Compare Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 18(3) (Eng.) (using
the word “annual” when referring to income in modern English income tax act), with 3
DOWELL, supra note 15, at 92–93 (discussing England’s Property and Income Tax
imposed in 1799 and showing how the law did not use the word “annual” when referring
to income).
63. § IIB, 38 Stat. at 167.
64. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
65. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917).
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This narrow view of tax legislation led the Court to conclude that
alimony was not taxable income under the 1913 Act. The Court
reasoned: “The use of the word itself in the definition of ‘income’ causes
some obscurity, but we are unable to assert that alimony paid to a
divorced wife under a decree of court falls fairly within any of the terms
employed.”66
While alimony did not fit within any of the specifically enumerated
categories, the Court failed to address whether the receipt fell into the
general category of “gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever.”67 The Court merely decided the case by fiat.68
There were two potential rationales for this narrow interpretation. The
first is based on the source-based definition of income, adopted later by
the Court in Eisner v. Macomber,69 that monetary benefits not derived
from either property or labor are not income.70 The second is a more
subtle and nuanced interpretation. It is based on the theory that the term
“income” has different meanings in different contexts. Justice Holmes
suggested elsewhere that Congress’s intended meaning of “income” in
the 1913 Act could be more limited than the term used in the Constitution
when he said:
[I]t is not necessarily true that income means the same thing in the Constitution
and the act. A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of
a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.71

Even though the possibility and logic of separate meanings was
emphatically denied in Eisner,72 this notion later reappeared in a
persuasive form in United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co.73 In
Supplee-Biddle, the Court suggested that, while it recognized that
Congress might have the constitutional power to tax a particular receipt
like life insurance proceeds, Congress would have to be much more
66. Id.
67. § IIB, 38 Stat. at 167.
68. The Court did mention the fact that the money was part of the former
husband’s income and his taxable income was not decreased by the payment. This
indicated that the Court’s decision to limit the statute was influenced by fairness
considerations. Gould, 245 U.S. at 153.
69. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
70. Id. at 206.
71. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
72. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 206.
73. United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189, 195 (1924).
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explicit before the Court would go against the generally perceived view
of the capital nature of the amount.74
Courts limit the meaning and scope of statutes when they conclude
that Congress could not possibly have intended such a result. It is a
generally recognized canon of interpretation that courts may limit the
scope of a statute or adopt a less obvious definition of a term in order to
avoid absurdity.75 However, nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinions
would suggest that taxing insurance proceeds or alimony would be
absurd. Instead, the Court was ruling on the basis of presumed
intent—what Congress would have concluded had the specific problem
been before it. This is one form of Anglo-American equity, the power of
the courts to limit the text in order to effectuate a social goal. The
premise in our society is that this goal is Congress’s goal or underlying
purpose. Courts often leave these goals in obscurity. The Supreme
Court never referred to the purpose of the Act, not even the obvious
congressional purpose to collect taxes. This inattention to rationale
indicates that the Court was resting its decision on its own perception of
good tax policy in providing exceptions and limitations to the scope of
the statute. Experience has shown that the type of equity that diminishes
goes hand-in-hand with strict construction, which fixes the original
intent of the legislature, hypothesizes the meaning of a term, and
ultimately places limits on the will of the legislature.
Several other cases are important in understanding the Court’s early
approach to income. One was not a Supreme Court opinion, but an
opinion by the eminent circuit judge, Learned Hand. These cases dealt
with the question of whether certain financial events produced income
within the general notion of that concept.76 One dealt with a specific
congressional interpretation of what that norm included.77
In United States v. Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co., in
considering the effect of a cancellation of the taxpayer corporation’s
indebtedness by its shareholder, Judge Hand found that the meaning of
the word “income” was “not to be found in its bare etymological
74. Id.
75. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1940).
76. See Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 171 (1926) (holding that
the gain on the repayment of a loan denominated in German marks with much cheaper
post-World War I marks was not income); Edwards v. Cuba R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 628, 632
(1925) (holding that subsidies from the Cuban government to build railway lines were
capital receipts and not subject to income taxation); United States v. Or.-Wash. R.R. &
Navigation Co., 251 F. 211, 212–13 (2d Cir. 1918) (holding that the cancellation of a
taxpayer corporation’s indebtedness by its shareholder should be treated as an increase in
capital and not as income).
77. See Eisner, 252 U.S. at 203 (holding that a stock dividend is a capital increase
and not income).
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derivation.”78 Rather, its meaning was “to be gathered from the implicit
assumptions of its use in common speech.”79 Implicit in an income tax
was a distinction between capital receipts not subject to tax and income
receipts, being “more or less periodic earnings.”80 Judge Hand concluded
that the cancellation of the debt was not income. This result had little to
do with his formulation of income as being “more or less periodic
earnings,” because that notion of income was primarily meant to
distinguish between income gains and capital gains. This would have
been a critical distinction under United Kingdom law because nonperiodic
capital gains had never been included in income, but in the United States,
certain gains from the sale of property had been included in income as
early as the 1861 Act.81
78. Or.-Wash. R.R. & Navigation, 251 F. at 212.
79. Id.
80. Id. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Hand was apparently unaware of the
significance of the fact that the word “annual” had already been deleted from U.S.
income tax acts.
The distinction between capital receipts, which did not qualify as income, and income
receipts became an underlying principle of taxation that is still with us today. An early
interpretation of this issue was made by the Court in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co., 268
U.S. 628 (1925). There the taxpayer had received subsidies from the Cuban government
for building railway lines. Id. at 629. These receipts were determined to be capital
receipts and hence not subject to income taxation even though the taxpayer had not
reduced its costs by the amount of the recovery and would get capital recovery without
having made an expenditure. Id. at 630–31. This was neither unrealized appreciation of
the taxpayer’s capital, nor indeed the taxpayer’s capital until received. Though the Court
denied it, it could only have been provided to the taxpayer for the service given to Cuba
in building the railroad. Id. at 632. Thus, this case was not even consistent with the
Court’s own justification. Its only defense could have been the no longer valid view of
regular or periodic receipts, or simply the dog-headed determination of the Court that the
Sixteenth Amendment “is not to be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated” to
situations not already thought about by Congress. Id. at 631. The significance of this
holding has been substantially diminished. See infra notes 158–61.
81. The relation between capital gains and the concept of income has not been free
from controversy in the United States. The first Civil War income tax act did not
address the issue directly other than to tax “the annual income . . . from any other source
whatever.” Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862). The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had ruled that a taxpayer who had purchased real
property twenty years previously was taxable on the income determined by the
difference between its sales price and his cost. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2516
(1864). The 1864 Act added specific language on the sale of real estate when purchased
in the year of assessment. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281
(repealed 1933). The apparent reason was that Congress did not believe that the Act
should apply to “purchases existing before we ever thought of passing an income tax or
internal revenue tax.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2516 (1864). Also, in Gray
v. Darlington, 82 U.S. 63 (1872), the Court held that the gain on the sale of bonds
acquired in 1865 and sold in 1867 was not income under the Act. Id. at 64–67. The
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The 1913 Act explicitly taxed capital gains as follows: “[T]he net
income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income
derived from . . . sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal,
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal
property.”82 Though the Supreme Court initially took the position that
capital gains were not income after the 1913 Act, the position was
initially examined as part of the question of taxing gains that were
accrued before income taxation in 1913, but realized in 1914.83 One
lower court concluded that Congress lacked the power to tax capital
gains at all because “[t]he meaning of the word ‘incomes’ in the
Sixteenth Amendment is no broader than its meaning in the act of
1867.”84 Nevertheless, the Court confirmed that capital gains were
income in both Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.85 and Eisner.86
Hand’s real reason for the Oregon-Washington decision was that the
corporation simply did not have gain. In reaching this conclusion, Hand
treated the cancellation of the debt as a contribution to the capital of the
corporation. As such, it was not income. To determine the transaction’s
proper consequences, Hand looked to what he considered to be the
substance of the transaction (a corporate-shareholder transaction) and
not to the transaction’s form (a debtor-creditor transaction).87
The Supreme Court affirmed this reliance on substance when it noted
that it was substance, not form, that controlled tax questions.88 This
approach was applied in Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. when the
Court decided that the gain on repayment of a loan denominated in
German marks with much cheaper post-World War I marks was not
income.89 The Court reached this conclusion because the essence of the
transaction was a loss.90 This construction treated the borrowing and the
repayment, the spending of the loan proceeds and their loss, as one
composite event for tax purposes.91 The early Court’s interpretation of
statutes according to the substance of the financial activities is squarely

Court concluded that gains accruing over a number of years were not “annual gains,
profits or income” within the meaning of the 1867 Act. Id. at 65–67.
82. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch.16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
83. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 230 (1918).
84. Brewster v. Walsh, 268 F. 207, 214 (D. Conn. 1920).
85. 247 U.S. 179, 184–85 (1918).
86. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
87. United States v. Or.-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co., 251 F. 211, 212–13 (2d
Cir. 1918).
88. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168, 184 (1921).
89. Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926).
90. Id.
91. Id.; see Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 362, 364–66 (1931)
(repudiating this analysis).
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within one aspect of the doctrine of the equity of the statute.92 These
interpretations provide graphic illustrations of courts imposing equitable
restraints on statutory language by proposed determinations of their
senses and reason.
The most sophisticated example of the Court’s assertion that there
were underlying principles that limited the meaning of income was in
Doyle.93 The question in Doyle was whether a taxpayer was permitted to
offset his receipts by the amount of his acquisition costs in taxing the
proceeds from the sale of property.94 The tax act at that time did not
contain explicit directions on this issue.95 The Court found that
offsetting the sale proceeds with its cost, allowing the tax free return of
capital, was implicit in the definition of income:
Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of
“income,” it imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or
capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax; conveying
rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities.96

Doyle is an excellent example of appropriate judicial gap-filling.
Capital gain, or the incremental change in an asset’s value, was what
Congress obviously meant to reach with its statutory concept of
income.97 The opinion can also be seen as an interpretation in the
context of whether the statute and the Constitution used the word
“income” to mean either gross income, which is the sum total of the
inflow to the taxpayer, or net income, which is the result after allocating
all costs to the inflow, including a provision for the preservation of
capital. There is no question that the income tax statute is a law
designed to tax net income. The important question is whether Congress
is limited by the Sixteenth Amendment to taxing net income, or whether
92. See infra text accompanying notes 236–43, 258.
93. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
94. Id. at 181–82. The 1913 Act merely called for the taxation of the “income
derived from . . . sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of
the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property.” Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch.
16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
95. Congress later amended the statute to explicitly provide for the recovery of
capital lost utilizing the concept of basis. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202, 40 Stat.
1057, 1060 (1919).
96. Doyle, 247 U.S. at 185.
97. This should be a relatively uncontroversial point because allowing cost
recovery was the original position of the Commissioner in interpreting the 1861 Act, see
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2516 (1864), and it comports even with the most
modern theories of income. See infra text accompanying notes 116–21.
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the concept of net income and the allowance of a deduction is a matter of
constitutional interpretation or congressional prerogative. This was an
important question from the beginning; in the debates surrounding the
passage of the 1861 Act, a strong move was made to include the word
“net” before the word “income” in the statute. This language was
rejected by parties who conceded that the tax was on net income. They
wanted the details of the term to be provided by the Secretary of the
Treasury and not the courts.98
B. The Court’s Decision in Eisner v. Macomber:
Formalistic Interpretation Triumphs
Eisner v. Macomber99 represents the high watermark of the early Court’s
restrictive approach to congressional power under the Sixteenth
Amendment. There, the Court was confronted with the question of whether
corporate dividends paid in additional shares of the company were income
when Congress had explicitly included these dividends as an enumerated
item of gross income.100 The Court began its analysis with a statement
clarifying the relationship of the word “income” in the Constitution and in
the statute that established a critical underlying principle of tax law.101 The
Court concluded that “income” in the statute was synonymous with the term
in the Sixteenth Amendment and that Congress had intended to exercise the
full measure of its constitutional powers in the Act.102 Thus, the question of
what was included in income was a matter of constitutional interpretation.
The Court’s formal approach can only be described as the application
of the plain meaning of the statute. The term “‘incomes’ . . . should be
read in ‘a sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time
of its adoption.’”103 This “common understanding” was “the commonly
understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the
people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”104
The Court remarked that all it needed to do to make its task “easy”
was to derive a clear definition of income as used in the common
speech.105 Although the Court acknowledged that this question “has
been much discussed” by the economists, it concluded that all it needed
98. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1861).
99. 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also Merchs.’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255
U.S. 509, 517–18 (1921).
100. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 199–200.
101. Id. at 203.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 219–20 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoting Bishop v. State ex rel. Griner,
48 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ind. 1898)).
104. Smietanka, 255 U.S. at 519.
105. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 206–07.
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to do to form its definition was to consult several dictionaries and two
prior cases.106 From these sources, the Court adopted the following
constitutional definition of income: “Income may be defined as the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.”107 The Court
was forced to add that this definition should be understood to include
income from the sale or conversion of capital assets because capital
gains are not included in the Court’s classic eighteenth century economic
concept of income.108
Basing its decision on the common meaning of the term did not
provide a ready solution for the Court. Standing in the way of the
Court’s decision was the fact that the United Kingdom, whose system
was founded on this same principle of income, taxed stock dividends
that represented accumulated profits as income even though the capital,
income, and realization concepts were bedrock principles.109 The reason
for this taxation was simple. A taxpayer had more stock after the
payment of the dividend. A stock dividend in law represented the
distributed profits of the corporation. Realization, the inflow of money
or property, had occurred.110 In other words, all of these things were
there as a matter of form.
Once again, the Supreme Court’s analysis relied on its view of
substance. The legal form of dividend distribution was immaterial; in
substance, additional shares did not change the economic position of the
shareholders because they did not change the value of the taxpayer’s
total stockholdings, and there was no true distribution of profits because
the income surplus underlying the dividend was switched on the
corporate books to capital.111 Significantly, the Court implicitly
proclaimed that the equity of the statute could use substance to
overcome the form of the transaction and it could negate Congress’s
explicit command, which was in conformity with the legal construction
of the transaction.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 207 (quoting Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415
(1913); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)).
108. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 116–21.
109. See Swan Brewery Co. v. Rex, [1914] A.C. 231, 234–36 (P.C. 1913) (appeal
taken from W. Austl.) (holding that stock dividends were taxable income). The modern
law on stock dividends is somewhat more lenient to taxpayers in the United Kingdom.
See Income and Corporation Tax Act, 1988, c. 6, § 249 (Eng.).
110. Swan Brewery Co., [1914] A.C. at 235–36.
111. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 208–12.
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C. Eisner v. Macomber: The Court Assigns a Meaning to the Term
“Income” that Is at Variance with Contemporary Economic
Approaches and Historical Understanding
The interpretation of the Court began with the linguistic meaning,
where all interpretation begins. One uses the conventions of speech to
determine how the author intended that term to be understood. As
pointed out by the Court, the linguistic meaning of “income” presents a
very special issue in American law because one is interested not only in
congressional intent, but also in the intent the American people had in
using the term in the Sixteenth Amendment.112
The term “income” at the time the Sixteenth Amendment and statute were
adopted was one that was generally used and that, in most cases, caused
little misunderstanding. However, it was not simply a common term like
“house” or “park.” It was a term of importance in business, accounting,
economics, and even the law. Within these fields, the term had various
senses in different contexts. Whose meaning should prevail?
The Court in Eisner indicated that it was not particularly interested in
economic concepts of income.113 However, the result of that case
enshrined one particular economic concept of income, which included
several implications that were not necessary to that concept. These
implications reflected an analysis published during the Court’s
consideration of the case by a prominent lawyer and economist, Edwin
R.A. Seligman.114
The Court’s conclusion that the concept of income in the statute and
Constitution was a legal concept, and not an economic or accounting
concept, was of critical importance to the future of income tax law. This
determined that the scope of the income tax base should not be within
the control of any particular profession or group other than Congress.115
112. See id. at 206–07; see also id. at 237–38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“That such
a result was intended by the people of the United States when adopting the Sixteenth
Amendment is inconceivable. Our sole duty is to ascertain their intent as therein
expressed.”).
113. See id. at 206–07.
114. See Edwin R.A. Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income?, 9 AM. ECON. REV.
517, 519–20, 529, 532–33 (1919).
115. The importance of this distinction between legal meaning or meaning
determined by some nongovernmental group can be seen in the provision that introduced
accounting concepts into the Revenue Act of 1919. Net income was to be computed “in
accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of
such taxpayer; but . . . if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the
computation shall be made upon such basis . . . as . . . does clearly reflect the income.”
Act. of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 19, § 212, 40 Stat. 1057, 1064–65 (repealed 1921). Here, the
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However, this did not mean that the relevant analysis of economists,
accountants, or even legal scholars should be ignored.
To discover meaning, interpretation should have confronted the term
“income” in its multidimensional meaning. Yet the Court failed to
consider over one hundred years of progress in economic and political
thought. The Court had described income in terms of its most basic and
historic sense as income derived from things or labor.116 This included
the value of the uses or services derived from property or labor and gain
from transactions in the nature of a trade.117 This concept was closely
related to a second concept of income, which economists referred to as
“national income.” National income was the sum total of all of the
economic activity of a community during a particular period of time,
including the total value of all goods and services produced by the
community.118 However, economic thought had changed dramatically
over the course of the nineteenth century—a movement that the Court
largely ignored. By the time the Sixteenth Amendment was debated,
economic theory had shown clear signs of the concept of income that we
now refer to as the comprehensive income tax base.
The earliest approach to this notion of income was developed in
Germany by Georg Schanz: “The concept of income turns out to be the
increase in net assets during a discrete period of time including the uses
and value of the work of third parties.”119 An American, Robert Haig,
formulated a similar conception: “Income is the money value of the net
accretion to one’s economic power between two points of time.”120
accounting profession’s understanding of the concept of net income is important, but it is
only binding if it satisfies the legal standard that accounting practice must clearly reflect
the income of the taxpayer. United States tax law, unlike United Kingdom tax law, is
thus ultimately independent of the views of the accounting profession. The resolution of
this problem in the United Kingdom is mainly the other way with accounting standards
being the legally appropriate benchmark. See generally Judith Freedman, Defining
Taxable Profit in a Changing Accounting Environment, 1995 BRIT. TAX REV. 434 (1995)
(questioning the U.K.’s practice of applying accounting standards to its tax rules).
116. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF
INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 44 (1938).
117. See I ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 365–75 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1979). For a
discussion of these points, see Barker, supra note 26, at 16–23.
118. See SMITH, supra note 117, at 286–87.
119. SIMONS, supra note 116, at 60 (quoting G. Schnaz, Einkommensteuergestetze,
Fnancz Archiv., XIII (1896), 23) (translation of quoted material provided by Professor J.
Muller-Peterson, Penn State Dickinson School of Law).
120. Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in
IX READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 59 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S.
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Haig’s fellow American, Edwin Seligman, whose views had an important
impact on the early development of income taxation in America, linked
income to the ability to consume: “[I]ncome . . . denotes that amount of
wealth which flows in during a definite period and which is at the
disposal of the owner for purposes of consumption, so that in consuming
it, his capital remains unimpaired.”121 As Robert Haig explained,
income is defined “in terms of power to satisfy economic wants rather
than in terms of the satisfactions themselves.”122 Implicit at least in the
statements of Schanz and Haig is the concept made explicit years later
by Henry Simons:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the
period to “wealth” at the end of the period and then subtracting “wealth” at the
beginning.123

Though one can hardly say that any particular concept of income was
in the minds of the American people upon the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment, these concepts, unlike the concept of income from things
or national income, theoretically justify certain features of United States
taxation. An example would be the taxation of capital gains. In
England, capital gains had not been considered income because it could
not be gain derived from capital; it was the capital itself.124 This was
based on the view established when the basic form of wealth was real
property. Land, whether it had grown more valuable in terms of market
value or not, was still the same capital that needed to be preserved.
Capital gains, of course, also fail the requirement of periodicity.
Capital gains taxation reflects in part new notions that income did not
need to be recurring or periodic.125 Of greater significance is that Schanz’s,
Haig’s, and Simons’s accretion concept of income reflects a more
sophisticated view of capital that should remain undiminished and free
from income taxation. The increase in capital as determined by market
values is income, not capital. This is because market value determines
one’s command over resources and measures one’s ability to consume.
In the Revenue Act of 1894, an obvious precursor to the Sixteenth
Amendment, Congress had taxed as income the value of gifts and
Shoup eds., 1959).
121. SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 19.
122. Haig, supra note 120, at 59.
123. SIMONS, supra note 116, at 50.
124. See Graham v. Greene, [1925] 2 K.B. 37, 41 (C.A. Eng.).
125. Note that Seligman still accepted this notion of income, but never
acknowledged its incompatibility with capital gains being included in income. See
SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 20.
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inheritances received by taxpayers.126 Under no possible interpretation
of the Supreme Court’s definition of income could these have been
income. They are neither an amount, use, or service derived from property
or labor, nor do they have the characteristic of periodicity. Under the
Court’s early approach, these items would have been nonrecurring
capital receipts that could not be income in the constitutional sense.
It would be ludicrous to contend that an aspect of income that had
been included in prior legislation was not in the minds of Congress and
the American people when the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted. Yet
only new economic concepts of income, apparently known to the Court,
could justify past practice. Modern theories demonstrated that the
traditional English practice of distinguishing capital receipts from
income receipts was faulty. Capital is not income solely because it
represents the value earned by the taxpayer that had already been subject
to income taxation and, thus, should remain undiminished and not be
subject to a second income tax. Its closest approximation is our modern
notion of basis, representing taxpayer cost.
Finally, it must be noted that in all practicality the Supreme Court was
not above ignoring its own definition in applying the equity that limits
legislative enactments. A cardinal principle of American law is that
imputed income, the personal consumption of the use value of one’s
own property or services, is not taxable income. The Supreme Court has
told us that “[t]he rental value of the building used by the owner does
not constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment.”127 According to the Court’s approach, the taxability of
imputed income depends on the common understanding of that term at
the time of the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. What was this
understanding? From the time of Adam Smith to the work of Seligman
in 1909, the market value of the use of one’s own property had been
income as a use value derived from property, fitting squarely within the
Court’s definition of income.128 In fact, a strong inference based on prior
126. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509, 553. The early
interpretations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pursuant to the Civil War tax
acts also included as income gifts of personal property ante mortem. See SELIGMAN,
supra note 54, at 469.
127. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 379 (1934). This statement
was, however, not controlling because the Court found that Congress’s language, taxing
the rental value of the owner-occupied property, was not really a tax on that value as
income, but was, in fact, an indirect way of denying a deduction for expenses. Id.
128. SELIGMAN, supra note 54, at 20–21.
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income tax acts in the United States is that imputed rental income is
income under the Internal Revenue Code. The original Civil War
Income Tax Act of 1861 charged tax on the income from enumerated
sources “or from any other source whatever.”129 The Act of 1863
allowed a taxpayer to take a deduction “for the rent of the dwellinghouse or estate on which he resides.”130 In order to equalize the
treatment of homeowners and renters who were receiving deductions for
the rent, Congress in 1864 specifically exempted the imputed income
from owner-occupied housing as follows: “[T]he rental value of any
homestead used or occupied by any person, or by his family, in his own
right or in the right of his wife, shall not be included and assessed as part
of the income of such person.”131 Significantly, both the deduction for rent
and the noninclusion of imputed rent was dropped from the 1894 Act.
This suggests that the notion that income included the rental value of
owner-occupied housing was commonplace and that even a nineteenth
century literal interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment would have
included such gain. Congress’s failure to exclude such gain from the
1913 Act should be persuasive evidence that statutory income includes
such amounts. As any rudimentary law school tax course’s economic
comparison of homeowners and renters demonstrates, homeowners
derive substantial financial benefit from the economic income derived
from their own property, thus treating them more favorably than renters.
D. The Dissenting Opinions in Eisner v. Macomber
Foreshadow the Future
1. The Majority’s Narrow Definition of Income
Was Not in Accord with the Plain
Meaning of the Term
In critiquing Eisner, some might agree with the Court’s methodology
but simply conclude that its construction was wrong. Justice Holmes
made this point when he stated in his Eisner dissent that stock dividends
were income even though the term “‘incomes’ . . . should be read in ‘a
sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its
adoption.’”132 Justice Brandeis also pointed out the majority’s mistaken
interpretation of the common meaning in his Eisner dissent when he
noted that stock dividends were considered taxable income in the United
129. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862).
130. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 74, § 11, 12 Stat. 713, 723 (repealed 1864).
131. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281 (repealed 1872).
132. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219–20 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoting
Bishop v. State ex rel. Griner, 48 N.E. 1038, 1040 (Ind. 1898)).
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Kingdom and in Massachusetts even though, for the purpose of allocation
between the life tenant and the remainder person, they might be considered
capital.133 But others would correctly view that the Court’s myopic
reading of the term “income” was a disingenuous misuse of statutes.
The Court’s early methodology was, in many respects, a perfect example
of what Roscoe Pound described as the common-law judge’s attempt to
“impede or thwart social legislation.”134 Under this perspective, the
judiciary is guilty of “narrow and illiberal construction of constitutional
provisions” and a “narrow and illiberal attitude toward legislation . . .
regarding it . . . as an alien element to be held down to the strictest limits
and not to be applied beyond the requirements of its express language.”135
2. The Majority’s Narrow Definition Was Not in Accord
with the Purpose Behind the Legislation
This observation provides the basis for a second critique of Eisner’s
majority. Holmes also suggested in his Eisner dissent that the interpretation
of “income” should be more than a question of plain meaning. He
believed that the statute should be upheld because the intent of the
Sixteenth Amendment was to remove the shackles on congressional
taxing power by getting rid of the questions of direct and indirect taxes
that had limited congressional power to tax citizens directly.136 This
argument was quite different from an argument over what the
American people intended the term to mean. Here, Holmes was not
referring to the common understanding of the term “income,” but
instead to the common understanding of the purpose behind the
constitutional amendment and legislation.
In his Eisner dissent, Justice Brandeis developed Holmes’s
understanding that the Sixteenth Amendment should be interpreted in
keeping with its purpose. Brandeis quoted the following language from
a state court case that indicated how such amendments should be viewed:
133. Id. at 236 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Trefry v. Putnam, 116 N.E. 904,
906, 911–12 (Mass. 1917); Swan Brewery Co. v. Rex, [1914] A.C. 231, 234–36 (P.C.
1913) (appeal taken from W. Austl.). However, judicial disagreements about what the
legislature or the common man must have meant when it used the term “income” are not
particularly helpful because they are essentially disputes about the largely unknowable
intent of large bodies of people, such as Congress or the American people, and they merely
provide an avenue for the substitution of the courts’ political judgment for the lawmakers.
134. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908).
135. Id.
136. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 220 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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[An amendment to the Constitution] is a grant from the sovereign people and
not the exercise of a delegated power. It is a statement of general principles and
not a specification of details. Amendments to such a charter of government
ought to be construed in the same spirit and according to the same rules as the
original. It is to be interpreted as the Constitution of a State and not as a statute
or an ordinary piece of legislation. Its words must be given a construction
adapted to carry into effect its purpose.137

Brandeis concluded that the American people “intended to include
thereby everything which by reasonable understanding can fairly be
regarded as income.”138 This language represents a profound shift from
a notion that income is defined by reference to a fixed semantic
understanding to one based on a concept subject to reasoned elucidation
and development.
3. Formalism’s Defect: The Dissents
Though many modern scholars still would agree with the majority that
interpretation is the process of determining the will of the lawmaker,
modern theorists distinguish between legislative intent as intended
meaning, which asks, “How did [the author] intend these words to be
understood?” and legislative intent as purpose, which asks, “What did
[the author] intend the enactment of the statute to achieve?”139
Traditional interpretation only delves into purpose where the plain
meaning is unclear or applying it would produce an absurd result.140 In
other words, taxpayers normally do not need to resort to legislative
purpose in order to understand that the legislative meaning of the word
“income” clearly includes many basic elements, like wages, interest,
dividends, capital gains, and so forth.
The use of legislative purpose as a tool to decipher meaning is directly
related to the legislative program’s level of detail. Plain meaning is well
suited to the particularization of rules. The more specific the language,
the more one can speak of a precise meaning. Purpose, on the other
137. Id. at 237 n.1 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Trefry v. Putnam, 116 N.E.
904, 906 (1917)).
138. Id. at 237.
139. GERALD C. MACCALLUM, JR., LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY 6 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds., 1993).
140. Three cases illustrate the importance of this approach. In Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the Court adopted the plain meaning despite
dissents that, allegedly, the result was absurd. Id. at 184–85, 196. In Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), the Court rejected the plain meaning of the
statute because it determined that its application would produce an absurd result not in
accordance with congressional intent. Id. at 459. In United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Court refused to apply the plain meaning because it
would “bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute.” Id. at
202 (quoting United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953)).
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hand, deals with the general goals of the legislation; “[i]t is what is
variously called the aim and object of the enactment, the spirit of the
legislation, the mischief and the remedy.”141 Courts assume that the
lawmakers attempt to accomplish a social purpose through their legislative
acts. At the very least, knowing the goal of the legislation helps the
interpreter understand what the legislator intended the words to mean.
Early Supreme Court interpretation of the charge to tax income was a
quest for intent as meaning as understood by “the People” when
the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted. Even the Court’s broad
construction—that Congress meant to exercise the full measure of a
taxing power in taxing all income, gain, or profit from any source—was
no more than a comment on the statute’s plain meaning.
Justices Holmes and Brandeis both concluded that the purpose behind
the amendment and the Act was important in determining the proper
scope of income. This may have been the only time that the Court has
directly utilized the aims and goals of the amendment in suggesting a
construction of income.
Where did Justices Holmes and Brandeis find evidence of purpose?
Purpose may be discovered by viewing a statute in context, that is, by
discovering the statute’s meaning from its role in the overall statutory
scheme. Purpose can also be derived from historical context, that is, by
viewing the statute as a reflection of the history of the times of which
courts routinely take judicial notice. Purpose can also be discovered
through Congress’s statements about legislative objectives as embodied
in legislative histories.
When viewed through this spectrum of purpose, Holmes’s view can be
said to be an assessment of the mischief and the remedy as learned from
his assessment of the historical need for a constitutional amendment.
Brandeis’s view, on the other hand, is more in keeping with a sympathetic
view that the effectiveness of statutory law should not be thwarted by
illiberal construction. Neither Justice, however, described the historical
context nor made reference to the Act’s legislative history. Even though
the Court’s attitude toward income taxation has dramatically changed
over the years, the Court has never discussed the historical context or the
legislative history of the 1913 Act.

141. J.A. Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U.
TORONTO L.J. 286, 292 (1936).

849

BARKER.DOC

1/9/2020 10:56 AM

V. FROM FORMALISM TO LEGAL PROCESS AND PURPOSIVIST
INTERPRETATION: THE REVOLUTION IN
INTERPRETATION, 1930–1956
The Supreme Court changed tack in the second third of the twentieth
century. In 1929, the stock market crashed and the Great Depression
began. Though the effect was not immediate, the Court began to change
its attitude toward social legislation. The lack of justice in the income
tax system became a celebrated cause in the national debate.142
A. The Supreme Court Applies Purpose and Limits the
Scope of Prior Precedents
The Supreme Court had already provided a definition of income as a
matter of constitutional law. A lower court judge, as early as 1927,
shrewdly assessed the significance of the decision as a matter of
common sense when he said:
Whether this description of income is to be regarded as exclusive of everything
not clearly within its terms, so that both the Sixteenth Amendment and the
statute (which is said to be the fullest exercise of the constitutional power) are
forever to be limited by a judicial definition, may still be doubtful, for the
Supreme Court is not in the habit of defining words abstractly, but only for the
purpose of determining whether the matter then under consideration comes
within their fair intendment.143

However, this view is inconsistent with Anglo-American judicial
method. A Supreme Court interpretation of a constitutional provision is
an authoritative pronouncement of what the law is in a common-law
jurisdiction. Courts no longer interpret the statutory term “income” as it
applies to particular acts; courts now must interpret and apply the
Court’s definition of the term “income.” Those who endeavor to
interpret statutes in the Anglo-American systems must grapple with the
common-law doctrine of stare decisis. Prior decisions are binding on
courts because of the perception that the law should be certain.
The American doctrine of stare decisis is more limited than the
English doctrine, where judges are bound even by their own prior
decisions.144 Courts in America are only bound by courts that are directly
superior in the appellate chain, and it has been argued that stare decisis is
142. See PAUL, supra note 17, at 199–208 (providing a historical account of
taxation in the United States in the years 1936 and 1937).
143. Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927) (citation omitted).
144. See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 118 (1987) (discussing the differences in the two versions of the
principle of stare decisis that have prevailed in the history of common law).
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not a rigid requirement in America.145 In tax, this translates into considerable
diversity in the law. In tax litigation, taxpayers have a choice among
three trial courts: the district courts, the Tax Court, and the United States
Court of Federal Claims. Appeals are processed by the thirteen federal
courts of appeals and, ultimately, the Supreme Court. Thus, judges are
only bound by the circuit court to which their cases are appealed and by
the Supreme Court. Except for Supreme Court decisions, there are few
binding precedents, and judges are free to interpret statutes while
fettered little by prior decisions. All judges are bound by the Supreme
Court, except for the Court itself, which binds itself only to the extent it
wishes to be so bound.
Judicial doctrine accepts the role of stare decisis even for the
interpretation of statutes. Unlike the Roman civil-law tradition, where
judges are required to interpret statutes while ignoring the previous
mistakes of other judges,146 the common-law trained jurist must deal
with the gloss put on statutes by interpretation as law.
The common law is similar to Roman civil law in that it has always
been developed to meet the needs of a changing society. Though
contrary to traditional thought, the income tax statute at times has also
been developed in much the same way as a private civil-law code would
develop. But this process would appear to be in conflict with commonlaw methodology as applied to statutes and with traditional thought.
The common-law method involves invoking, developing, or overcoming
the force of prior judicial decisions.147 This applies whether or not the
ultimate source of law is case law or statute. History shows that,
beginning in the 1930s, the Supreme Court’s decisions evinced a process
of overcoming the force of the earlier Court’s pronouncements on
income. Because of the weight of stare decisis on statutory interpretation,
much of this development was concealed.148
The jurisprudence of the early Court has since spent its force. Gould
v. Gould149 was overruled without judicial comment by section 71 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which provides that alimony payments are income

145. Id.
146. See RENÉ DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY
183 (Michael Kindred ed., 1972).
147. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 51–52 (1978).
148. This was Roscoe Pound’s view of case law development of the common law.
See id.
149. 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
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to the recipient.150 Though Oregon-Washington151 has been considered
without being specifically overruled, its underlying view of debt
cancellation was reversed in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.152 Today,
debt discharge is generally included as income subject to certain
statutory exclusions.153 Again, in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,154 the
Court considered Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.155 with regard to a
contract that had been performed over several years at a loss. Though
the Court did not overrule Kerbaugh-Empire Co., it did limit the case to
the facts.156 The Court decided Burnet on the grounds that related
transactions could not be collapsed and that each receipt and expenditure
must be accounted for separately to preserve the integrity of the taxable
year.157 This doctrine robbed Kerbaugh-Empire Co. of its rationale.
Finally, Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co.,158 which treated a foreign
government subsidy as a capital (nonincome) receipt, was restricted in
Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner.159 Its anomalous result, to the
effect that a capital contribution by a nonshareholder was not income
and that the taxpayer had a fair market value basis in the property
acquired with the contribution,160 has been cured by the Code, which
now provides that the property acquired shall have a zero basis.161
The Court has also indicated its disagreement with Eisner v. Macomber,
that the Constitution’s notion of income requires realization. In
Helvering v. Horst,162 realization was relegated to a rule “founded on
administrative convenience.”163 Though the concept of realization is a
fundamental principle of income taxation, it is considered so due to
Congress’s, not the Supreme Court’s, intent.
Without doubt, the Court’s expressed attitude to income tax law
interpretation changed in the 1930s. Literal interpretation was abandoned
for a more purposeful, contextual approach to interpretation164 because
literal interpretation “would often defeat the object intended to be

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
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I.R.C. § 71 (2000).
United States v. Or.-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co., 251 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1918).
284 U.S. 1, 1–3 (1931).
I.R.C. § 61(a)(12).
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926).
Burnet, 282 U.S. at 364.
Id. at 364–65.
268 U.S. 628 (1925).
319 U.S. 98, 103 (1943).
Id. at 101–03.
I.R.C. § 362(c) (2000).
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
Id. at 116.
See Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93 (1934).
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accomplished.”165 The Court remarked that a statute should be interpreted
“in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the
literal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.”166
The income taxation crisis confronted by the Court in the 1930s and
1940s was not a question of what was included in the definition of
income, but a question of whose income it was. Income tax over the
years had quickly changed from a rather insignificant tax to one with
much higher progressive rates. Tax avoidance by people with means
became an important activity and an important issue in the Great
Depression years.
The central issue of the times was the validity of property or services
income assignment from one taxpayer to another. In these cases,
taxpayers had transferred certain rights to income to others.167 There
was no question of whether these amounts were income; they clearly
were. There also was another party, the actual legal owner of the amount in
question, who was willing to report and pay tax on these items. The
government claimed that the amounts given to others either through
common-law forms or trusts were income taxable to the assignor.
The government’s many victories through the courts can only be
attributed to the application of the spirit of the law. Indeed, the Court
explicitly applied a legislative purpose in creating a new legal doctrine,
concluding that “[t]he dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the
taxation of income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to
receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when paid.”168 The Court derived
this purpose not from any congressional statement but from its
understanding of the legislation as a whole. The Court never explained
why this purpose was so important. The explanation is self-evident once
one understands how income taxation works. The reason necessitating
income allocation to the proper taxpayer was the protection of the
integrity of the personal, progressive income tax system.
In the United Kingdom, income taxation had been primarily withheld
at source, and steeply progressive taxation was not a factor until the
twentieth century. Traditionally, a taxpayer’s identity was not significant.
165. Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934).
166. Id. at 465.
167. See, e.g., Helvering, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (discussing assignment of interest
income from bonds); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 332–34 (1940) (discussing
assignment of income from property through a trust); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113–
15 (1930) (discussing assignment of service income).
168. Helvering, 311 U.S. at 119.
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When rates finally became steeply graduated and taxpayers became
more likely to attempt tax avoidance, the courts, accustomed to their
traditional role of literal interpretation, deferred to Parliament’s authority
and expertise in coping with the problem.169 This was also the result of
legislative distrust of the courts’ ability to give proper effect to the ideas
behind the legislation.170 Thus, United Kingdom tax legislation has a long
history of narrow, detailed drafting, restricting the role that legislative
purpose has in the interpretive process.171 However, in the United
States, the Court “circled the wagons” to protect the tax system’s
integrity. Proper allocation of the burden of taxation to the appropriate
taxpayer was deemed critical to the function of a personal, self-assessed,
progressive system.
Though the assignment of income cases172 do not shed light on the
precise question of what income includes, they do show a change in
attitude as to what the income tax law is all about. Courts began to recognize
that Congress’s goal was to tax each person’s income comprehensively,
in accordance with the substance and reality of the particular situation.
No longer did courts ask what the common understanding was; courts
now asked what the truth or reality was.
Thus, the meaning of income was changing from a fixed linguistic test
of the common understanding of the people who adopted the Sixteenth
Amendment to a concept of reason. In Helvering v. Horst,173 the Court
stated that to maintain that a taxpayer never had income when he
anticipatorily assigned bond coupons “is to affront common understanding
and to deny the facts of common experience.”174 The taxpayer had
income even though he had received nothing because disposition of the
coupons was the receipt of money’s worth as it gave satisfaction to the
taxpayer that could only be procured by the expenditure of money.175
The Court had adopted a new approach. It used an equitable principle
of construction in favor of the government utilizing principles of right
and justice derived from its construction of the legislative purpose to
extend the statute in a way that made it effective. This purpose derived
169. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster was the high
watermark of this traditional approach. There the House of Lords affirmed that the courts
must respect the legal form that the parties had chosen. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue v.
Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1, 15 (P.C. 1935). This was followed by the courts until
1982, when the House of Lords took a more substantive approach to tax avoidance in W.T.
Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1982] A.C. 300 (P.C. 1981).
170. See Jones, supra note 37, at 585.
171. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 144, at 323.
172. See cases cited supra note 167.
173. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
174. Id. at 118.
175. Id. at 117.
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from the structure and practical processes of the Code as a whole.
Justice Barton confirmed this understanding of what the Court was
doing when he remarked that “Section 22(a) [now Section 61 on gross
income], upon which the Cifford case rests its expansion of the
traditionally taxable income of the taxpayer, invites or at least permits
the broad interpretation given to it.”176
Broad purposeful income tax law interpretation was clearly now the
accepted norm, as artfully set forth by Justice Frankfurter: “Legislative
words are not inert, and derive vitality from the obvious purposes at
which they are aimed, particularly in the provisions of a tax law . . . .”177
Yet, in viewing the changing attitudes of the Justices toward statutory
interpretation, one needs to consider how these evolutions affected the
Court’s approach to past authoritative interpretation, which some Justices
believed to be based on outmoded interpretive approaches. In the United
Kingdom, when the House of Lords makes an authoritative interpretation,
tradition dictates that the authority to change interpretations, whether to
cure mistakes or to adapt legislation to unanticipated situations, belongs
solely to Parliament.178 However, U.S. courts, while acknowledging the
importance of stare decisis in promoting certainty and continuity in the
law and in sustaining the reasonable expectations of citizens, reserve the
right to reexamine their own doctrines, especially in constitutional
interpretation. In the United Kingdom, such interpretations are not fixed
because Parliament can always overrule them. In America, if the
Supreme Court could not overrule prior constitutional interpretations,
only the people could, because Congress itself cannot.
B. The Supreme Court Overcomes the Force of Stare Decisis
Thus, 1940 marked an important turning point at which the Court openly
rejected the fetters of past precedent in interpreting tax statutes. In
Helvering v. Hallock, the Supreme Court considered the validity of an
interpretation that had been followed for over ten years in over fifty
Supreme Court and lower court decisions.179 The Court emphasized the
necessity that its interpretive role become unfettered from its own
doctrine: “[W]e cannot evade our own responsibility for reconsidering in
176.
177.
178.
179.

Estate of Spiegel v. Comm’r, 335 U.S. 701, 713–14 (1949).
Griffiths v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 355, 358 (1939).
See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 144, at 118.
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 123 (1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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the light of further experience, the validity of distinctions which this
Court has itself created. Our problem then is not that of rejecting a settled
statutory construction. The real problem is whether a principle shall
prevail over its later misapplications.”180
In overruling its prior decision, the Court stated that it was not required to
follow an interpretation that “on further examination, appear[s] consonant
neither with the purposes of the statute nor with this Court’s own
conception of it.”181 This view of statutory interpretation was consonant
with Justice Frankfurter’s enunciated view of constitutional interpretation
when he said, “But the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the
Constitution itself and not what we have said about it.”182 Here we see
an approach that appears compatible with that of the Roman civil-law
tradition, in that the Court interprets the statute and not its prior
interpretations of the statute. The Court sees its role as dynamic, as an
evolving process interpreting law in the light of new experience. At the
same time, the Court sees its role as grounded in accomplishing
Congress’s purpose.
As previously noted, several cases in the early 1930s cast serious
doubts on the Court’s prior determinations of the scope of income.183
However, these cases were quick to distinguish, and not to overrule,
their predecessors, a technique that is frustratingly common in AngloAmerican jurisprudence. With Hallock, however, the stage was set for
the Court’s fundamental change in its approach to the interpretation of
the concept of income.
C. Intentionalism and Purpose in the Judicial Development of the
Concept of Income in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
The foundation of modern income analysis examined in every basic
tax course is Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.184 The actual holding,
that punitive damages awarded in an antitrust case are income, is not
what makes this case important. What is critical to the scope of the law
can be summarized in two statements. First, the Eisner v. Macomber
income definition was repudiated as an unwarranted limitation on the
concept of income.185 Second, the Court outlined a new approach to
income: “Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth,

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
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clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”186
There is an almost mystical power to Chief Justice Warren’s words. It
is as if the student can (with the careful guidance of her professor) begin
with these first principles and, step by step, unfold the very nature of
income. One who knows what the law actually is understands the danger of
this approach, because the Code is rifled with exceptions and qualifications.
Yet, where the “is” varies from the “ought,” where Congress does not
live up to the potential of this approach, logic demands an explanation.
Emphatically stated, this is the ideal approach to studying tax law
because by contrasting the “is” and the “ought” of taxation, we establish
the economic consequences, the imminent relevance, of Congress’s and
the Court’s policies.
However, to look at Glenshaw Glass as the case that redefined income
is in fact to betray its clear objective. Instead of precisely defining income,
the Court repudiated the use of a definition to restrict congressional
purpose. The Court did not say that the definition of “income” in Eisner
v. Macomber was wrong; instead, the Court remarked that it had served
a useful purpose in the context of distinguishing gain from capital.
However, the definition “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all
future gross income questions.”187
The Court did not substitute a new definition. It merely stated that the
item in question satisfied certain factors (accession to wealth,
realization, and control) that were reflective of the statutory language.
In other words, Glenshaw Glass’s moral is that courts should not try to
frustrate congressional intent by providing a precise definition when
Congress has not. The Court stated:
This Court has frequently stated that this language was used by Congress to
exert in this field “the full measure of its taxing power.” Respondents contend
that punitive damages, characterized as “windfalls” flowing from the culpable
conduct of third parties, are not within the scope of the section. But Congress
applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels
as to their nature. And the Court has given a liberal construction to this broad
phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except
those specifically exempted. . . . Such decisions demonstrate that we cannot but
ascribe content to the catchall provision of § 22(a), “gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever.”188

186.
187.
188.

Id. at 431.
Id.
Id. at 429–30 (citations omitted).
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The breadth of this view of the charge to tax is challenged by some.
In discussing this language, Borris Bittker and Martin McMahon remark,
“[T]his generalization is clearly too broad; it is obvious that Congress
did not intend to tax a number of major items (e.g., home-produced
goods and the rental value of owner-occupied residences), even though
they constitute ‘gains’ and are not specifically exempted.”189 Though
present doctrine excludes these items, one must be careful when
conferring natural law status on an established interpretation. As
previously shown, the evidence is formidably against the notion that
imputed rent is not income.190 With regard to home-produced goods, even
eighteenth century concepts of income included these items as income.
Moreover, in the 1894 Act, Congress specifically excluded these
amounts, suggesting that the normal concept of income could include
such amounts. The 1913 Act did not have a similar exclusion. Such an
omission is evidence of a contrary intent and may well have led the
Treasury Department to seek, unsuccessfully, to treat the value to a
farmer of the consumption of self-produced goods as income in Morris
v. Commissioner.191
Several years after Glenshaw Glass, Chief Justice Warren and the
Supreme Court returned to the question of the fundamental nature of
income in James v. United States.192 There, the Court overruled its own
precedent and found that the defendant embezzler had income subject to
tax on his wrongful appropriations. The Court cited Glenshaw Glass,
explaining in carefully chosen words that all income from whatever
source derived has “been held to encompass all ‘accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.’”193
The word “encompass” reaffirms that the Court does not mean to limit
the concept of income by its own language.
In James, the Court also established the equitable basis of a broad
approach to income. It suggested that failing to correct its past error
would “perpetuate the injustice of relieving embezzlers of the duty of
paying income taxes on the money they enrich themselves with through
theft while honest people pay their taxes on every conceivable type of
income.”194 Implicit here is an acknowledgment that an underlying goal
of income taxation is that all should share the burden of government in
accordance with the real command over resources. Of course, that is the
189. BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS ¶ 3.1, at 3-6 (1988).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 129–33.
191. 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1277–78 (1928).
192. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
193. Id. at 219 (emphasis added) (quoting Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431).
194. Id. at 221.
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principle behind the doctrine that inclusions in the tax base should be
liberally interpreted, while exemptions should be narrowly construed.195
VI. THE FORGOTTEN PURPOSE: THE HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF
INCOME TAXATION IN AMERICA
The Supreme Court has found and frequently reiterated that Congress
intended that the scope of the charge to tax income should be interpreted
broadly. Though Congress intended income to be inclusive, that does
not really answer the question as to what income means. The Court once
believed that all it needed to do was have “a clear definition of the term
‘income,’ as used in common speech,” and its task would be easy.196 It was
disingenuous to start with a narrow reading of income divorced from the
contributions provided by economic and accounting theory while at the
same time looking unofficially at what economists had to say for guidance.
Considering the brief history of income taxation at the time, to assert that a
concept like income was simply a symbol of a previously worked out series
of detailed rules was puerile. This is not simply a modern-day judgment of
the difficulty of ascertaining the parameters of this word. A prominent
figure in the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, Elihu Root, provided
these thoughts at the time in response to a statement concerning people who
had trouble understanding income taxation:
I guess you will have to go to jail. If that is the result of not understanding the
Income Tax law, I shall meet you there. We will have a merry, merry time, for
all of our friends will be there. It will be an intellectual center, for no one
understands the Income Tax law except persons who have not sufficient
intelligence to understand the questions that arise under it.197

The early Court’s narrow reading is also attributable in part to its
refusal to consider the aim and purpose of income taxation when
adopted by the American people and Congress. Even at that time, the
use of purpose was commonplace as a tool in discovering the meaning of
statutes.198 To discover purpose, courts look at the statute as a whole, to
the historical context in which the statute was enacted, and to any
relevant legislative history. To seek help in every direction is natural, as
noted by Chief Justice Marshall years ago: “Where the mind labours to
195.
196.
197.
198.

Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206–07 (1920).
See PAUL, supra note 17, at 102.
See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892).
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discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid
can be derived . . . .”199 Even when the Court adopted a more purposeful
approach to income taxation, the Court never discussed either the Act’s
legislative history or the historical context leading to its passage.
A. The Purpose of Congress and the American People
As reported in the legislative history, enactment of the federal income
tax was the culmination of years of political struggle:
For 25 years a contest has been waged throughout the country in behalf of the
adoption of a national income tax as a permanent part of our fiscal system, and
the sentiment in favor of this movement finally became so strong that the people
overturned a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States by writing into
the Constitution the first amendment within 40 years.200

The income tax was the result of a long and often bitter struggle.201
Proponents were spurred to persevere because of general resentment of the
tax system then in place. In describing the previous system, that is, the
“mischief,” the House Committee remarked, “These taxes rest solely on
consumption. The amount each citizen contributes is governed, not by his
ability to pay tax, but by his consumption of the articles taxed. . . . The
result is that the poorer classes bear the chief burden of [those taxes].”202
The purpose of this legislation was clear. The tax on net income “is in
response to the general demand for justice in taxation, and to the longstanding need of an elastic and productive system of revenue.”203
Income was chosen as the basis for this system because “[t]he tax upon
incomes is levied according to ability to pay, and it would be difficult to
devise a tax fairer or cheaper of collection.”204 Moreover, not only does
an income tax “equalize the tax burden,”205 it also provides an important
educative role in a democratic society. In contrast with many consumption
taxes, which are hidden, “[a] personal knowledge of the amount of taxes
required of the people would more closely enlist their interest and active
cooperation in all the affairs of government, and especially with respect
to revenues and expenditures.”206
These powerful statements establish that the manifest goals of the
income tax were the collection of revenue and economic justice.207 This
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
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H.R. REP. NO. 63-5, at XXXVII (1913).
See generally PAUL, supra note 17, at 30–109.
H.R. REP. NO. 63-5, at XXXVII.
Id. at XXXVI.
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was not the individual, particular sense of justice enshrined in traditional
taxation that equated the taking of property to the criminal law, but a
general sense of justice, social justice, that regarded tax as a social duty and
held that justice requires substantive equality of treatment. For the
Sixteenth Amendment accomplishes an important gain for economic justice
and bears a proud place in our Constitution’s struggle for human justice.
B. The Role of Purpose in the Interpretation
of the Concept of Income
How exactly did the people or Congress expect this to be achieved?
How is a principle of justice made an organic part of legislation?
Congress chose to tax the entire net income of the taxpayer. The
substantive provisions of the 1913 Act were contained in only two
pages. Though the charge to tax has been slightly modified, the intent
has remained the same.
Present law declares that “gross income means all income from
whatever source derived.”208 To the student who first reads section 61,
the statement appears ridiculous. One should never define a word in terms
of itself. However, to one who has been exposed to the purpose of Congress,
the language is divine inspiration. The Sixteenth Amendment provides
that “Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived.”209 The statute provides no room for
equivocation; statutory income encompasses the full potential of the
Sixteenth Amendment except to the extent that the term is limited by a
specific congressional act. Moreover, Congress emphasized this in the
language of the statutes from the start; it commanded that the concept of
income should be taken in its broadest sense. The 1913 Act never
attempted a comprehensive definition of income, but instead emphasized
its inclusive nature by providing that “the net income of a taxable person
purpose than the collection of revenue. In the context of a more limited statute, Judge
Easterbrook remarked: “[T]he ultimate purpose of a tax code is to raise revenue, and the
many rough cuts that result from the political battles about how much will be paid by
whom should not be revised, in litigation, to make them look more like one side’s idea of
an ‘ideal’ tax.” Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 115 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir.
1997). Though this strong textualist argument may have some relevance to some
detailed statutory provisions, it does not apply when one looks at the broad concept of
income in the American context of the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment and the
resulting language of the statute.
208. I.R.C. § 61 (2000).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages,
or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in
whatever form paid, . . . or gains or profits and income derived from
any source whatever.”210
Income is a concept, not a rule. Neither the Constitution nor Congress
chose to contain it by defining it in all of its particulars. That decision
was inspired. As shown by the history of the early Court’s interpretation
by selective definition, definitions have, as Pound put it, “nullif[ied]
legislative action.”211 Clearly the Court’s approach in Glenshaw Glass
has superseded such archaic views.
Implicit in Glenshaw Glass is the recognition that the concept of
income is not simply a series of substantive rules but rather a form of
somewhat indeterminate content. Though much of the content was clear
both in 1913 and more particularly today, this clarity has been the result
of an evolving process of interpretation by supplying content. This was
recognized by the Court in Glenshaw Glass when it stated, “[W]e cannot
but ascribe content to the catchall provision of § 22(a), ‘gains or profits
and income derived from any source whatever.’”212
History has shown that one cannot supply content to this legal form by
a mere logical unfolding of its meaning. There is no thing in itself of a
knowable or unknowable nature that is called income. Instead, income
as legal form is an abstraction of the economic and social acts of man in
civil society. This norm is a general premise for juridical and juristic
reasoning;213 interpreters must conn its meaning out of the ever-changing
complexities of human existence.
In order to interpret the concept of income, courts must consider the
historical roots of income taxation in America. Yet the Court has never
acknowledged the historical forces that raised this phoenix from the
ashes to which the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Co.214 had relegated it. Likely this is because it is impolitic to mention
the history of class conflict as the context for the passage of both
amendment and statute.
Income taxation in America was the culmination of a progressive
democratic struggle starting in the nineteenth century to “reach the vast
amounts of wealth generated by the rapid and massive industrialization
of the United States, to shift the tax burden from real property and

210. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (emphasis added).
211. Pound, supra note 134, at 387.
212. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955).
213. See POUND, supra note 147, at 56–57 (discussing legal rules and legal principles).
214. 158 U.S. 601, 634–35 (1895) (declining to consider conclusions not pertaining
to the case at hand).
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consumption onto financial and industrial assets.”215 The first major
highlight was the bitter debate and passage of the 1894 Act. The 1894
Act was introduced with the charge that, under the previous system of
consumption taxation, “want, not wealth, pays the taxes.”216
Congressional proponents of the measure denied its class base,
describing income taxation as “a just principle of taxation”217 or as
providing “equality in taxation and in opportunity.”218 Opponents of the
legislation decried its class basis and maintained that this principle of
taxation was being taught to Americans by foreign socialists,
communists, and anarchists.219
Though the legislation passed, the Supreme Court, in the opinion of
some, saved the nation from anarchists and communists by declaring the
income tax a direct tax and unconstitutional.220 Arguments presented to
the Court contained much of the same invective in opposition to the
law.221 Justice Field in his concurring opinion agreed that it was “class
legislation” and found that its “essential character” was the same as a
1691 English tax act that taxed Protestants, Catholics, and Jews at
different rates.222 The dissents were not restrained either. Justice Harlan
declared the decision to be “a disaster to the country.”223 Justice Brown
saw the taxpayers’ arguments that raised the specter of socialism for
what they were—a conjuration “to frighten Congress from laying taxes
upon the people in proportion to their ability to pay them.”224 Moreover,
he recognized the class motivation in the majority’s decision when he
expressed his hope that this might not “prove the first step toward the
submergence of the liberties of the people in a sordid despotism of
wealth.”225 These same debates that had been presented both to Congress
and the Court were repeated throughout the passages of the Sixteenth
Amendment and the 1913 Act.226
215. JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 382 (1985).
216. 26 CONG. REC. app. 413 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1894) (statement of Hon. McMillin).
217. PAUL, supra note 17, at 39.
218. Id. at 37.
219. Id. at 38.
220. See generally Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895),
modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
221. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 450, 452, 497–98, 532.
222. Id. at 596 (Field, J., concurring).
223. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 684 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 695 (Brown, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. See PAUL, supra note 17, at 71–109 (discussing the history of taxation in the
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Those opposed to income taxation recognized that income taxation is
an affront to private property, which is an American constitutional
guarantee. Progressive income taxation in particular can affect the
distribution of wealth which clearly limits the right of property which, in
the words of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, is an
“inviolable and sacred right.”227
It is significant that the Sixteenth Amendment was the first change to
our Constitution since the Civil War amendments. The American
people do not amend their Constitution often. Up until that time, the
object of the Constitution was to secure the democratic revolution,
which established the freedom and equality of man as political man, as
citizen. However, the original Constitution was not complete. In order
to ensure certain liberties, the first ten amendments were added. In
order to stamp out the inequity of slavery upon which the original
Constitution was in part based, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments were adopted. In order to make America more
democratic and extend participation in the body politic, the Seventeenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments were
passed.228
In a democratic society, political equality does not mean economic
equality. Civil society brings with it the reality of tremendous economic
inequality. An income tax is aimed at bridging the gap between political
and economic life. Progressive taxation subjugates the individual’s free
will to accumulate property to the societal interest in equitable taxation
and in the redistribution of wealth. Thus, the historical context, the
legislative history of income taxation, and the provisions of the 1913 Act
itself, in particular its progressive features, all attest to the conclusion
that the aim of the American people and Congress was to collect income
in such a manner as to achieve distributive justice. Indeed, in terms of
economic inequality it has been stated that “[b]efore the era of
entitlements [the income tax] was the only direct way to address the
class gap.”229 Thus, whereas the Constitution guards and fosters the
potential of the American democratic revolution, the Sixteenth Amendment
guards and fosters the potential of the American economic social
revolution. Whereas the Constitution holds out the promise of greater
United States and events leading to the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment).
227. LA CONSTITUTION DU 1789, DECLARATION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DU
CITOYEN art. 17 (Fr.), reprinted in ERIC CAHM, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY
FRANCE (1789–1971): A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1972).
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (democratic election of senators); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (women’s suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (abolition of poll tax); U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI (franchise for eighteen-year-olds).
229. See STANLEY, supra note 52, at 244.
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political equality, the Sixteenth Amendment holds out the promise of
greater social and economic equality.
VII. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF TAX STATUTES IN
THE CONTEXT OF MODERN APPROACHES TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The purpose of Congress and the American people was clear, and
modern interpretation recognizes that congressional purpose is relevant
to statutory interpretation. Moreover, modern interpretation recognizes
that legislative history may be used to determine that purpose. Where
schools of interpretation differ is on the question of appropriate use. By
examining the reasons underlying the different approaches in the context
of income taxation, one can see that only certain approaches reflect the
core values of a democratic society.
A. Textualism and the Heritage of Formalism
Textualists are the present-day representatives of traditional literal
statutory interpretation.230 They embrace the concept that the members
of the judiciary are the faithful agents of the legislature whose task is to
carry out the legislative design, not create one of their own.231 They claim
to be law declaimers, not lawmakers. They share with other schools the
notion that what they need to determine is congressional intent. To
textualists, intent is “‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable
person would gather from the text of the law.”232
Strong adherence to the words of the text is an important principle of
statutory interpretation. Textualists justify their strong attachment to
linguistic construction with their conception of the federal judiciary’s
appropriate role in a country governed by a written constitution that
establishes the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
Lawmaking belongs to the legislature; law interpretation belongs to
the courts. Interpretation is a process of declaring and elaborating the
230. Representative examples of textualist scholarship include, for example, Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution,
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986–87).
231. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 415 (1989).
232. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 17 (1997).
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written text in its application to the resolution of the parties’ problems.
Congressional intent alone must govern the outcome, but no matter how
often textualists may look at other sources for meaning, they profess a
strong commitment to the actual words used in the text.
Textualists see statutes not as policy, but as politics. They understand
congressional intent as the sum of the individual intents of all the
legislators voting in favor of the act, and they assert the unknowability
of the individual motivations of the legislatures.233 When dealing with
the Constitution, the problem of the sum of the individual intents of
those responsible for its adoption or amendment is compounded. Thus,
the impossibility of determining the lawmakers’ intent robs judges of
justification for going beyond the text to discover it.
Textualists found this methodology on their conception of the
constitutional framework for legislation and the checks this framework
places on the role of the judiciary. Legislation is the result of bicameralism
and compromise.234 Federal legislation must go through two separate
divisions, the House of Representatives and the Senate. Representation
in the Senate favors smaller states. Thus, politics and the legislative
process are a process of compromise; legislatures achieve what they can
even if it is not all that the majority wants. Statutes do not enact broad
policies, but instead specific compromises. Strong adherence to the text
promotes the strength of political minorities in the process. The minorities
involved are not those traditionally discriminated against, like AfricanAmericans, non-Christian religious groups, or immigrants, but rather
Americans resident in smaller states. The result is that textualists find the
central core of our constitutional system in its opposition to democracy.
Whether or not this rationale is a correct reading on our constitutional
structure, the textualist rationale does not apply to the concept of
income. The language of the 1913 Act gives absolutely no indication
that the concept of income represented a compromise in principle.
Income was all “gains, profits, and income . . . of whatever kind and in
whatever form paid . . . from any source whatever.”235 Moreover,
amendments to the Constitution affect the constitutional structure of our
society. The people spoke through the Sixteenth Amendment. Income
taxation would not be limited by a constitutional scheme of tax
apportionment based on nondemocratic states’ rights that thwarted the
people’s desire for social reform.

233.
234.
235.
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B. Textualism, Purposivism, and Intentionalism: The Use
of Concepts, Standards, and Principles
Most theories of interpretation recognize that statutes with a high level
of detail require courts to adhere to more conventional approaches to
interpretation unless such an approach produces an absurdity. But
purposivists and textualists alike recognized that literalism may not be
what Congress intends and that there is room for more dynamic court
rules: “When flexibility is more crucial than precision . . . Congress is
free to legislate in more open-ended terms.”236 Roscoe Pound described
the distinction herein as between rules, which allow for little if any
judicial discretion, and precept elements, which act as “guides to judicial
decision and administrative action.”237 Pound includes concepts and
standards as precepts principles.238 Where Congress uses concepts,
principles, or standards, as opposed to rules, even textualists recognize a
more expansive form of interpretation relying on purpose.239
The difficulty for textualism in acceptance of these generalities is in
the application. It might ultimately make little difference whether income is
a rule or a precept because it appears that even the use of precepts cannot
contradict the conventional meaning of a word.240 A textualist requires
that the meaning of the term “income” would be that of “a skilled,
objectively reasonable user of words.”241 As Justice Scalia has stated,
“[T]he acid test of whether a word can reasonably bear a particular
meaning is whether you could use the word in that sense at a cocktail
party without having people look at you funny.”242
Thus, modern textualists might very well have agreed with the early
Supreme Court’s narrow approach to income. “Income” was a word of
fixed and determinate content; its meaning was that which most people
would agree to at the time. This is the meaning of the lowest common
denominator. However, such a narrow definition contradicts constitutional
and congressional purpose and shows little respect for congressional
legislative power.
236. Manning, supra note 41, at 108.
237. ROSCOE POUND, OUTLINES ON LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 76 (5th ed. 1943).
238. Id.
239. Manning, supra note 41, at 108.
240. Id. at 107.
241. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988).
242. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

867

BARKER.DOC

1/9/2020 10:56 AM

Is income a precept or a rule? In common parlance, one speaks of the
concept of income, not the rule of income. Hart and Sacks described a
rule as “a legal direction which requires for its application nothing more
than a . . . determination of fact.”243 Hart and Sacks recognized that there
are different kinds of words used in statutes. Some words are “small and
precise, . . . referring to more nearly regular patterns of experience[s].”244
Others “are very large ones, on a high level of abstraction, carrying a
very broad delegation of power.”245 A standard “requires a comparison
of the quality or tendency of what happened in the particular instance
with what is believed to be the quality or tendency of happenings in like
situations.”246 Standards govern the resolution of problems by relating
acts to principles or models of reasoning. Concepts, as abstractions or
generalized ideas, should be viewed legally in the same way as standards
and principles.
One knows that income is a concept with the possibility of
development because both the American people, through the history of
their struggle for reform, and Congress, through its legislative history,
have told us that income tax was chosen for its manifestation of
principle. Income tax establishes a principle of fair and just taxation based
on the principles of one’s ability to pay. This leads to redistributive
justice accomplished directly through collection and indirectly by the
provision of an elastic and productive system of revenue. These
fundamental ideological truths, established through constitutional
amendment and statute, are the motivating force which can only be
given recognition by developing income as a concept in accordance with
these principles.
The use of concepts, standards, and principles confers considerable
discretion on the judiciary, and hence, lawmaking power of sorts.
Textualists, in repudiating this role, reach a result that could not be more
contrary to the design and purpose of the law. By asserting exclusive
legislative lawmaking, legislative power is undermined by restricting the
various means of accomplishing legitimate constitutional tasks. Purposivist
interpretation, on the other hand, aims at molding legislation according
to the teleology of congressional aim and purpose. The purposivist
approach can justify discretionary lawmaking power in the branch
formally unaccountable in the democratic process. Thus, the different
schools expose the dilemma: Can there be a democratic judicial
methodology in the United States?
243. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139 (1994).
244. Id. at 140.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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It is clear that the Warren Court’s approach to income in Glenshaw
Glass embodies such an approach by treating income as a concept with
the potential for development. Examining the parameters of judicial
discretion through consideration of the English-American-Roman
doctrine of the equity of the statute exposes a democratic justificatory
basis for this approach.
C. The Anglo-American Doctrine of the Equity of the Statute
Since the time of James Landis, the doctrine of the equity of the statute is
one that many scholars have evoked to justify judicial activism in dealing
with statutes.247 The doctrine’s precepts are intertwined with modern
interpretation and justifications for judicial discretion. John Manning has
written a well-documented article that asserts that the case for this doctrine’s
survival and appropriate use as part of American judicial method is suspect,
both historically and as a matter of the judiciary’s constitutional power.248
Manning is only partially correct. While one aspect of the doctrine,
negative equity, is incompatible with our form of democratic government,
the other form, positive equity, is compatible.
One of the oldest and best statements on the equity of the statute is
found in Plowden’s note to Eyston v. Studd.249 He stated that “equity . . .
enlarges or diminishes the letter” of the law in accordance with its sense
and reason.250 Negative equity, or the power to limit the natural meaning
of the words of a statute, is clearly based on the view that the legislature
could not have intended absurd or harsh results that are outside or that
do not advance the statutory purpose.251
This expression of the equity of the statute doctrine in the least
intrusive form of its negative aspect is compatible with textualism. Pure
textualism will only abandon the obvious interpretation where there is a
plausible alternative and the defect in the obvious construction is
extreme. Both textualism and the equity of the statute doctrine can
247. See generally James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV.
L. REV. 886 (1930) (discussing the importance of courts’ attempts to give effect to the
legislature’s intent when interpreting statutes).
248. See generally Manning, supra note 41 (arguing that the English equity of
statute doctrine failed to survive structural innovations that differentiated the U.S.
Constitution from its English common-law ancestry).
249. Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695, 699 (K.B. 1816).
250. Id. at 695.
251. See Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965); see also Manning, supra
note 41, at 22, 32.
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evaluate statutes, however, in terms of fundamental principles of justice
outside the statute and limit statutes by these principles where they
conflict. The equity of the statute doctrine justified such use on the
conviction that there were immutable natural law principles that statutes
must adhere to. Textualists usually conclude that only the Constitution
provides principles of justice that control congressional acts.252 But even
textualists find deeply embedded principles to check statutes under the
principle that Congress must be understood as acting in terms of the
context of these principles of justice.253
Modern theory no longer relies on natural law justification. However,
any generally derived standard of morality, as distinguished from one
derived from the Constitution or a statute, is simply a new natural law
justification that should have no force in our legal system to restrict
congressional action. It is simply the judges’ conceptions of what they
believe to be accepted principles of morality, politics, or convenience that
impose restrictions on the democratically elected lawmaker in the
name of higher authority. The only authority higher than Congress is
the Constitution.
Turning to Plowden’s description of the equity of the statute, one sees
that the language does not necessarily support a free-ranging judicial
power to limit the scope of statutes by discovered principles outside
specific constitutional requirements. It is the sense and reason of the
statute that is the context for the exercise in the discovery of statutory
meaning, not principles found outside legislative purpose. Thus, limiting
meaning by an equitable negating power can be regarded as a fulfillment
of legislative intent only if it is in accordance with the legislative aim
and purpose. This sense of equity reflects its roots in Roman law.254
D. Roman Civil Law Analogical Development of Statutes
In the Digests, this rule of interpretation was stated by Paulus as “[b]ut
what has been received into law contrary to the reason of the law is not
to be carried out to its consequences,”255 and by Iulianus as “[i]n cases
where rules have been laid down contrary to the reason of the law, we
cannot follow the rule of law.”256 In the Roman and modern civil-law
tradition the reason of the law is the aim and purpose of the statute itself.
252. See Manning, supra note 41, at 106–07.
253. Justice Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1913, 1914 (1999).
254. See Manning, supra note 41, at 30 & n.124.
255. ROSCOE POUND, READINGS IN ROMAN LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW AND MODERN
CODES AS DEVELOPMENTS THEREOF 15 (2d ed. 1914).
256. Id.
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The restriction of statutory scope is only justified on the basis of
legislative objective, not principles discovered outside the legislative
scheme. This is the traditional view of the civil-law tradition discussed
by Salkowski, who severely limits this conception as follows:
On the contrary, restriction of a statute according to its ground (cessante legis
ratione cessat lex ipsa), to be distinguished from restrictive interpretation, is not
allowable; that is, the application of a statute will not be prevented by the fact
that we can find no inner basis for it, whether it appears irrational (unreasonable
or inconvenient), or the circumstances for which it was designed have changed, or
the ratio (motive or purpose) of the rule may not fit the particular case in hand.257

Traditional interpretation in the civil-law tradition is restrictive with
respect to statutes that have been written too broadly, which is the civillaw form of our absurdity doctrine. Thus, like textualists, traditional
civil-law doctrine rejects the equity of the statute’s power to limit
legislative acts in accordance with equitable principles of justice.
As noted previously, Manning has made an argument for the
proposition that the equity of the statutes doctrine was incompatible with
the new American constitutional system, which relied on the central
concept of separation of powers. This view is amply justified historically
when applied to negative equity. The French Revolution also produced
a new regime and, in enacting the Civil Codes, it too considered the
roles of legislatures and courts and the issue of judicial power and
equity. Portalis, the spokesperson for the government, declared that
equity under the new regime did not include the power to dispense with,
or limit, statutes. He was reported as saying:
One of the orators has pretended that we were giving to the judges a power
denied by the Constitution. ‘I think,’ he has told us, ‘that we have no tribunals
of equity that may dispense with the statutes. There is a court of equity in
England; in Rome the prater was the judge of equity; in France the King had the
right to give dispensation, and the Parlemens often deviated from the letter of
the statute. But, among us, the calling of the judge is confined to the faithful
application of the statutes.258

Thus, the arguments against the negative application of the equity of
the statute doctrine are the arguments of the French and American
Revolutions resisting the power of judges to limit the democratic voice
by discovering principles of natural law or justice outside the statute.
257.
258.

Id. at 19 (quoting SALKOWSKI, INSTITUTIONEN § 5).
I JEAN-GUILLAUME LOCRÉ, LA LÉGISLATION CIVILE, COMMERCIALE
CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE 480, 481 (1827).
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This democratic starting point establishes the common sense proposition
that statutes declaring norms do not contain an implicit power to suspend
the force of these very norms by providing to the judiciary a general
negative capability of undoing congressional acts.
The Supreme Court’s early interpretation of income reflects this
consequence. Literal interpretation may be negative equity by another
name. It may accomplish much the same thing by limiting possible
meanings. By selecting a limited meaning in Eisner v. Macomber from
among various possibilities, the Court indirectly conformed the text to
its view of the aims and purposes of the statute and the Sixteenth
Amendment. Literal linguistic interpretation can conceal application of
negative equity, which is an affront to the constitutional structure under
which the judge is the faithful agent of the legislature. Thus, a rejection
of the equity of the statute by formalism may be no more than the
rejection of positive equity, the beneficial aspect of the doctrine.
Negative equity is the power to dispense with congressional design
based on principles outside the statute’s context. Positive equity is the
power to affirm congressional design. Positive equity authorizes judges
to elaborate, develop, and extend the statute’s scope to cover problems
not apparently covered by the written words. This is an aspect of classic
purposivist interpretation, the ability to develop the statute in accordance
with its aim or purpose. Though textualists strictly contain the doctrine,
even they recognize possible grants of gap-filling authority to
administrators and courts.259
Positive equity is thought to comply with the notion that the
legislature is the lawmaker. Since Roman times, the perception has been
that the courts merely carry out the legislature’s intent. Iulianus reported:
“Neither statutes nor senatus consulta can comprehend all points one by
one, but when in any case their intent is clear the magistrate ought to
proceed by analogy and thus declare the law.”260
The French, notoriously adverse to judicial discretion at the time of
their revolution, nevertheless adopted positive equity of the statute as a
central tenant of their civil codes.261 While negative equity was perceived
as a power denied to judges by their constitution, positive equity was
not.262 The reason that elaboration or extension is compatible with the
legislation’s power over lawmaking is that the object of such “genuine
interpretation is to discover the rule which the law-maker intended to
establish.”263 Pound distinguished such genuine interpretation, where
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
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Manning, supra note 41, at 21.
POUND, supra note 255, at 14 (quoting Digest I, 12 (Iulianus)).
See DAVID, supra note 146, at 158–59.
LOCRÉ, supra note 258, at 481.
Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907).
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the judge tries to discover the legislative intent from the purpose found
in the context and history of the act, from spurious interpretation, where
the judge tries to determine that intent by assuming “the law-maker
thought as we do on general questions of morals and policy and fair
dealing.”264 Genuine interpretation answers the demand of democratic
society for the judiciary to be true to the authentic lawmaker, the
legislature.
The Roman principle of the analogical development of statutes, which
seeks to treat the unanticipated case similar to that which the statute
explicitly provided for, is also the basis for the English doctrine of the
equity of the statute. Henrici de Bracton remarked, “Equity is the
bringing together of things, that which desires like right in like cases and
puts all like things on an equality. Equity is, so to speak, uniformity,
and turns upon matters of fact, that is, the words and acts of men.”265
This is the principle of analogy, which is “a principle of justice
conceived as proportion.”266
VIII. THE PRINCIPLED DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF INCOME:
PURPOSIVIST INTERPRETATION AND
INTENTIONALISM UNITED
Income is a concept informed by principle and not a rule. This premise
suggests that the content of the norm cannot simply be explained or
declared as a matter of linguistic interpretation; it is greater than the
collective unknowable thoughts of the individual legislators or the
common understanding of that term. For the common understanding of
a broad concept like income is not precisely knowable. Moreover, the
debates in politics and economics show that the word “income” did not
have a fixed or predetermined meaning.
Thus, the jurisprudence of income taxation allows for the development
of the concept of income by analogy. Simply put, the legal concept is
developed through judicial method in accordance with Congress’s
policies and principles. This process is similar to an aspect of the
English equity of the statute. It is fundamentally the Code-based civil264. Id. at 381.
265. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 25
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968).
266. Patrick Nerhot, Introduction to LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND ANALOGY:
FRAGMENTS OF LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND LINGUISTICS 6 (Patrick
Nerhot ed., 1991).
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law tradition of the analogy of a law whereby the statutory text is
employed through analogy to provide for the unanticipated case.
The choice of the word “unanticipated,” and not the words “unprovided
for,” is significant. New developments were provided for because
Congress chose a concept governed by principle and not simply a rule.
The principle established by Congress and the American people and the
legal method for its determination allows for historical development of
the law in a nonarbitrary fashion.
Thus, the legal imperative contained in the word “income” is an
instruction to supply content to the norm in order to effectuate these
purposes. It is the plan of both Congress and the American people that
income be construed to effectuate the just principle that people should be
taxed in accordance with their ability to pay and in accordance with their
command over resources. Thus, while specific changes in economic
behavior, legal forms of investments, and ownerships may not have been
anticipated by the American people and Congress, they were provided
for because Congress instructed the people to pay tax on their income, a
concept that unfolds in light of the principles of ability to pay and
distributive justice. As a legal form, income invokes a command to
develop its content analogically. This is precisely what happened in the
assignment of income cases267 and in Glenshaw Glass. This relation
between purpose and the meaning of the term “income” was astutely put
in the early years of taxation by Judge Sternhagen in Hawkins v.
Commissioner: “[I]t is conceivable that . . . the income tax is primarily
an application of the idea of measuring taxes by financial ability to pay,
as indicated by the net accretions to one’s economic wealth during the
year . . . .”268 Economist Henry Simons expressed this approach even
more instrumentally and abstractly when he suggested, “[income’s]
meaning may be sought by inquiring what definition would provide the
basis for most nearly equitable levies.”269
This suggests that the interpretation of income tax law in America
presents an important development in the history of jurisprudence.
Traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence does not allow for the
development of tax statutes through analogical reasoning or positive
equity. Similarly, analogical development of statutes was only applied
by the legal method of Roman or civil law to general laws.270 Public
laws like tax and criminal laws did not permit extension due to the
general civil-law doctrine that laws imposing disabilities on individuals
267. See cases cited supra note 167.
268. 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927).
269. SIMONS, supra note 116, at 42.
270. See Mitchell Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 TUL. L.
REV. 485, 500–01 (1935).
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were narrowly construed.271 The American experience with income
taxation has been different. Americans started with a general, comprehensive
code of income tax law. Over the years, the Code has been interpreted
in accordance with the evolving principle that the social interest in the
just and comprehensive exercise of the public power to tax, which was
established through constitutional amendment, justifies analogical
development of the text.
Often, the debate over the appropriate use of purpose in statutory
interpretation is examined in terms of the differing approaches to what
courts should do when “a statutory text fits poorly with the purpose
apparently underlying its enactment.”272 In such cases, purposivists
believe that literalism must give way to purpose; the textualists favor
linguistic interpretation enforcing “the conventional meaning of a clear
text.”273 However, the Court’s present approach to income indicates that
the intended meaning of income and the purpose underlying the Act are
not in conflict. That should not be surprising because concepts reflect
their underlying purposes and principles. Thus, because the purpose
derived from the forces that brought the legislation into being,
purposivism and intentionalism united.
Concepts, standards, and principles are dynamic by their very nature.274
They can develop to provide general premises for judicial reasoning in
order to “supply new rules, to interpret old ones, [and] to meet new
situations.”275 This understanding of principles provides a clear break
with the understanding of textualists. Though some recognize that
principles are open-ended, their conception of the faithful agent
hypothesis limits their consideration to the meanings and knowledge of
those responsible for the legislation.276 The dilemma is whether one can
allow for development and still remain true to legislative intent. When
the lawmaker enacts standards and makes clear its aim and purpose,
courts become truer agents of the legislature when they effectuate these
policies and not when they turn their backs on these policies and limit
271. See DAVID, supra note 146, at 158.
272. Manning, supra note 41, at 3.
273. Id. at 4.
274. Roscoe Pound described three categories of norms other than rules: principles,
concepts, and standards. POUND, supra note 147, at 56–57. He described conceptions as
“more or less exactly defined types.” Id. at 57. The concept of income is a type that
should be developed in accordance with its underlying principles.
275. Id. at 56.
276. See Manning, supra note 41, at 109, 125.
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legislation’s effectiveness to a limited time and place. The key is
whether meaning is to be derived solely from the historical knowledge
of the time, or whether there is elasticity to the concept capable of
taking into consideration new knowledge to meet new situations and to
reconsider old. Textualists assert that certainty in the law is a
fundamental principle of justice that favors the individual and the
status quo, a principle of continuity that restricts the development of
social legislation. Whereas standards like the “reasonable man” in
torts or “good faith” in contracts are acceptable, these areas of private
law traditionally have been dominated by the judicial development of
common-law principles.
Purposivists relegate certainty to a lesser position that does not have
the force to overcome clear congressional purpose in the light of new
social relations. This attitude was provocatively summarized by the
realist Jerome Frank: “[Y]et law must be more or less impermanent,
experimental and therefore not nicely calculable. Much of the uncertainty
of law is not an unfortunate accident; it is of immense social value.”277
Concepts, standards and principles create uncertainty. It is neither
possible nor desirable to provide a fixed and absolute content to their
form. However, their economical expression is the foundation of the
two-hundred-year-old success of our Constitution278 and the ninety-year
success of the Sixteenth Amendment and the federal income tax system.
Laws limited to particular social conditions cannot pass the test of time.
Laws based on principles capable of development can continue to
provide the basics for just law. Income remains the basis for our tax
system today, which must contemplate a much different economic order.
Justice Brennan’s lines regarding the Constitution apply with equal force
to the Sixteenth Amendment and the Internal Revenue Code: “[T]he
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have
had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”279
Textualists resist such a role because it grants discretionary lawmaking
power to the judiciary. Textualists assert that judicial lawmaking power,
outside the historically sanctioned judicial power in private law developed
through common-law method, is improper in light of separation of
powers. Yet they accept grants of lawmaking powers to the executive

277. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930).
278. See generally Mitchell Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method
and Its Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut;
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487, 504 (1966).
279. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 43 GUILD PRAC. 1, 7 (1986).
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branch.280 However, textualists make a critical objection from our
democratic society’s point of view. They allege that some purposivists
authorize judges to substitute their own judgments as to proper policy
for that of the legislature.281
As clearly pointed out, extensive interpretation does not necessarily
need to embrace the substitution of the judiciary’s judgment for that of
the legislature. The basis for the positive equity of the statute is Roman
analogy, which in its modern traditional form asserts: “By analogy we
understand the extension of a rule according to its inner basis (ratio
legis) to analogous cases not foreseen in the expression of the rule,
founded upon the internal consistency of the rule . . . .”282 The analogical
method appropriately expounds the legislative design because analogy is
based on “a principle of justice conceived as proportion, since what is at
the basis of analogy is the principle of universality,”283 that is, the
principle that similar cases should be treated similarly. Because a
principle of justice must guide analogical inference, this method justifies
historical development without arbitrary departure from the legislative
design.284 Nerhot suggested that “the logical form of analogy is in the
last analysis based on a principle of distributive justice,”285 which is the
foundation principle of the Sixteenth Amendment and our tax law. The
American people reformed their Constitution to provide for taxation
based on adherence to the principle of taxation in accordance with
ability to pay to create democratic economic justice. Thus, the guiding
principle of justice is that the analogical development of the concept of
income is that of the lawmakers, Congress and the American people.
The Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass established the genuine legal
role of the legislative text by expansive development of the concept of
income. This treatment is justified in terms of constitutionally required
deference to the legislature where the analogical unfolding of the text
produces the real possibilities of the lawmaker’s text. It is only legitimate
interpretation when it reflects the ideologies that undergird congressional
280. See Manning, supra note 41, at 21.
281. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 116
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, 1522–23 (1998); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 585 (1988).
282. POUND, supra note 255, at 19 (quoting SALKOWSKI, INSTITUTIONEN § 5).
283. Nerhot, supra note 266, at 6.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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enactment of progressive income taxation.
To recognize that the norm is form is to understand that the content of
law is, at least in part, ambiguous. Justice Frankfurter concluded, “Statutes
as well as constitutional provisions at times embody purposeful ambiguity
or are expressed with a generality for future unfolding.”286 Frankfurter’s
ambiguity is the indeterminacy of the standard Congress has chosen.
The indeterminacy of form can lead to different possible interpretations,
especially at the edges. The early Court, employing a textualist-like
approach, imposed a historical concept of income on the Code that was
out of sync even with the thought of the times and with legislative
practice. This is an example of the dominance of legal method or form
over the content or substance of the law. However, purposivists recognize
that teleology should dominate legal method. In other words, the
content and command should be developed in terms of the law’s
purpose. Traditional Roman extensive interpretation and traditional
doctrine of equity of the statute does just that. Some purposivists enlarge
judicial power by making provision for statutory development in
accordance with the judge’s conception of the appropriate purpose for
the statutes substituted for that of the legislature. This is one form of
dynamic purposeful interpretation, as described by Eskridge. It is
invoked “whenever the perspective of the interpreter departs from the
perspective of the statute.”287 The judge perceives a contradiction between
original intent and current societal goals. This encourages the judge to
displace the original purpose with his new perspective. The interpreter
replaces the ideology of Congress with his own.288 The judge’s purpose,
not that of Congress, thus controls the outcome. As one author has
expressed, income could mean anything depending on one’s concept of
equity.289 These views attest to the tremendous power of legal method
when it is freed from the purpose of the lawmaker. Legal method as
form is a priori; content as substance is a posteriori.290 Legal method
controlled by newly conceived purposes transforms lawmaking from a
legislative prerogative to a judicial one.
Pound put this point forthrightly by branding this procedure as

286. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 528 (1947).
287. ESKRIDGE, supra note 281, at 11.
288. Id. at 77.
289. Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 53 (1990).
290. See Mitchell Franklin, Influence of the Abbé de Mably and of Le Mercier de la
Rivière on American Constitutional Ideas Concerning the Republic and Judicial Review,
in PROSEPCTIVES OF LAW: ESSAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT 96, 98–102 (Roscoe
Pound et al. eds., 1964) (discussing how some scholars justify the hegemony of
subjective form or of the a priori over the content or a posteriori).
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spurious interpretation or judicial lawmaking.291 The judge assumes that
the lawmaker “thought as we do”292 and develops the content of the law
in a way “which appeals most to our sense of right and justice for the
time being.”293 Pound recognized that “the object of spurious interpretation
is to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely to discover,”294 and
justifies such judicial legislation “in formative periods by the paucity of
principles, feebleness of legislation, and rigidity of rules characteristic of
archaic law.”295 Pound’s own rationale, however, could hardly justify
such liberties with the concept of income.
Principles of justice govern juristic reasoning. Interpretation requires
“a value judgment, an assessment of the ratio of the norm and of the
teleology inherent in it.”296 The value judgments may be those of the
statute itself or those of the normative system in general. The teleology
may be that of the democratically elected lawmaker or that of the
appointed judge.
Democratic society has formally conferred the choice of values on the
legislature. Analogical development is “justified only if such development
reflects or deepens the policy and aims of the lawmaking or authentic
power.”297 Hermeneutic philosophies of interpretation provide a justification
for the judge to reinterpret the problem in light of the judge’s superior
understanding of the problems the judge must face.298 This is simply a
substitution of the judge’s preferences of justice for those of the
authentic power of the legislature.
By enacting the federal income tax, Congress clearly expressed a
preference for the principles of societal justice over individual will, for a
system based on using state power to change the distribution of wealth.
The early Court’s legal method limited meanings in opposition to this
purpose. The Court’s approach, developed over the years, now sees the
meaning of the term “income” in terms of this purpose.
Following historical purpose as the principle of justice governing
291. Pound, supra note 263, at 381.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 382.
295. Id. For a similar view that the doctrine of the equity of the statute had a
similarly appropriate place in the pre-Constitution development of American law, see
Manning, supra note 41, at 113.
296. Zaccaria, supra note 10, at 54.
297. Mitchell Franklin, A Study of Interpretation in the Civil Law, 3 VAND. L. REV.
557, 563–64 (1950).
298. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 281, at 4–5.
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analogical development aligns the judiciary with the historical forces
that created the income tax as a mechanism for economic justice in
allocating society’s resources. The demands of the American people or
of democratic society have not changed over the years from the original
intent of income taxation. Departing from original intent in any way by
limiting the reach of income taxation to a less comprehensive measure
because of a judge’s conception of new societal needs would change the
statute’s meaning in accordance with the undemocratic forces that wish
to veer the income tax system away from its progressive foundation to
accomplish the preservation of inequitable taxation and the status quo.
The ambiguity of legal form or method is at the heart of this struggle.
To say that the concept of income is ambiguous is to say that it is not
fixed, that is, its meaning must be constantly won.299 Interpretation is a
struggle for meaning in which various forces try to impose their value
choices on the content of law. Congress and the American people
clearly enunciated the goal of income taxation, which must now be
constantly affirmed.

299.
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